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WE'RE ALL WINNERS: GAME THEORY, THE
ADJUSTED WINNER PROCEDURE AND
PROPERTY DIVISION AT DIVORCE
INTRODUCTION
It has been estimated that close to half of all current
marriages will end in divorce.1 Before the divorce reform
movement in the 1960s, there were two rule systems to divide
property in a divorce.2 The first scheme, called the separate
property system, divided property based on who was the title
holder.3 The second scheme, called community property, with
few exceptions,4 evenly divided all property acquired after the
date of the marriage between the couple.5 Since the 1960s
1 See Carol B. Liebman, A Theoretical Basis for Divorce Negotiation, in
NEGOTIATING TO SEITLEMENT IN DIVORCE 1, 1 (Sanford N. Katz ed. 1987); see also
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of
Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 405-06 (1996) ("Americans today
are more likely to experience divorce than any other type of civil litigation.")
[hereinafter Garrison(l)].
2 See Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital
Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115, 117
(1997) ("[u]ntil the last half-century, courts divided property between divorcing spouses
under either of two very different marital property systems," the title system and the
community property system); see also infra note 6.
a See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 177 (2d ed. 1987) (finding in separate property states, "each spouse owns the
property standing in his name"); Bell, supra note 2, at 117 ("the title system...
required that courts award property to the spouse who held title to the property during
marriage.").
4 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(1) (Mcinney 1986 & Supp. 1999) (keeping
premarital property, gifts, inheritances, and personal injury awards separate from
marital property for purposes of marital property division in divorce); Bell, supra note
2, at 121 (recognizing that community property schemes considered "property acquired
through gift or inheritance, or owned prior to the marriage, [was] the separate property
of the individual spouse," exempt from division as marital property).
See CLARK, supra note 3, at 177 (finding that in the community property
states, "each spouse has an existing interest in the assets of the" marriage); Bell, supra
note 2, at 121 ("[rlegardless of how title is held, each spouse owns one-half of all
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attempts have been made to improve the divorce process and
the substance of the resulting agreement.' To avoid the
potential unfairness under the old rules, legislatures developed
new property distribution rules.' Equitable distribution rules
fall into this category.8 To improve the divorce process, the
divorcing couple was given greater control and flexibility to
privately divide marital rights and responsibilities.9 To verify
that a privately negotiated divorce is equitable, the court must
still approve any agreement the parties reach.
Even though the legislature created new rules for
judges to follow when dividing marital property, these rules
only incidentally affect most couples because the rules do not
marital property," which includes all income earned by the spouses and property
purchased with those earnings).
See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1443, 1470 (1992) ('Until the late 1960s, American law recognized no such thing as a
consensual or privately ordered divorce."). Prior to divorce reform in the 1960s, divorce
was granted only if one party was at fault. Procedurally this required one party to
become a plaintiff and accuse the other party of some form of wrongdoing. This
procedure was modified with the introduction of no-fault divorce. See June Carbone &
Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and
Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1991). Presently no pure fault based divorce
jurisdictions remain. Removing fault from divorce led to new standards for crafting
divorce agreements. See id. at 960-61; Garrison(l), supra note 1, at 403 ("Instead of
bright-line rules, legislatures have typically given judges in the divorce court almost
unlimited discretion, bounded only by indeterminate standards or lists of factors that
maybe considered.").
7 See Bell, supra note 2, at 121 (finding that in response to concerns over the
inequity in the old common law property division scheme, legislatures began enacting
statutes granting the wife increased property rights); Suzanne Reynolds, The
Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address
Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 827, 837-39 (finding that the divorce reform movement,
motivated partially by inadequate alimony awards, recognized "more explicitly" the
need for property distribution to provide support); Garrison(l), supra note 1. For an
example of an inequitable divorce agreement resulting from application for common
law property division rules see Wirth v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App.
Div., 3d Dept. 1971).
8 Equitable distribution is the name given a type of divorce law which grants
the judge discretion to divide the marital property. The statutes usually require the
judge to consider a specific list of factors when making the decision. See, e.g., N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 236B(6)(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1999) (requiring courts to
consider thirteen factors, ranging from the duration of the marriage to the tax
consequences for each party, when deciding how to divide the marital property at
divorce).
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 953 (1979) ("The no-fault revolution
has made divorce largely a matter of private concern.").
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control private bargaining." Compared to the equitable
distribution rules, the legislature has not provided couples
with similar guidance for dividing their assets, liabilities, and
child-rearing responsibilities through private bargaining."
While a judicial decree is always necessary, in most cases the
decree merely "rubber stamps" the agreement the two parties
privately negotiated.12 Since most divorces are resolved through
private bargaining, couples would benefit from assistance in
the negotiation process.' 3 To preserve the couple's control over
the process, guidance should not dictate results, but rather
prevent an unfair result. If a divorcing couple reaches a
settlement they agree is fair, less court time will be needed to
resolve disputed issues.
4
This Note reviews a procedure, called Adjusted
Winner, developed by Steven J. Brains 6 and Alan D. Taylor, 7
that they claim will facilitate negotiations between a divorcing
" It has been estimated that less than ten percent of divorces require
adjudication. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 951 n.3. Since equitable
distribution regulates how judges should distribute marital property, the statutes only
indirectly impact divorcing couples. See id. at 950 (finding that divorce law provides
some framework within which divorcing couples can privately determine the
distribution of rights and responsibilities).
" See id. at 969 ("[Elxisting legal standards governing custody, alimony, child
support, and marital property are all striking for their lack of precision and thus
provide a bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty.").
12 Id. at 951. Mnookin and Kornhauser claim that in the United States as
well as England, most couples are able to resolve their distributional concerns without
a judicial resolution. See id.
13 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 957 ("[plarties should be
encouraged to settle [economic issues themselves"). Because the law was created, not
with bargaining in mind, but with regard to adjudication, they suggest it would be
better if the law was used to encourage private settlement of economic issues by
providing for "efficient and fair mechanisms for enforcing such agreements and for
settling disputes when the parties are unable to agree." Id.
14 It is this envy between parties at divorce that the Adjusted Winner was
designed to rectify, without sacrificing efficiency. See STEVEN J. BRAmS & ALAN D.
TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROi CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 67 (1996)
(claiming that Adjusted Winner simultaneously delivers three benefits: envy-freeness,
efficiency, and fairness based on the parties preferences) [hereinafter BRAIS &
TAYLOR(l)]. See infra Part III.
"' See id.; STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, THE WIN-wIN SOLUTION
(1999) [hereinafter BRAMIS & TAYLOR(2)].
'G Professor in the Department of Politics, New York University.
17 Marie Louise Bailey Professor in the Department of Mathematics, Union
College.
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couple and result in an envy-free property distribution."8 Very
little has been written analyzing the procedure from a legal
perspective. Brams and Taylor believe that the potential for an
envy-free 9 result is the primary benefit of their new procedure.
The procedure is an interesting tool because it creates
incentives for divorcing couples to avoid strategic behavior and
coercion, forces the couple to act rationally, and introduces a
formal system into the bargaining process." This Note suggests
that the procedure in its current form has some limitations, but
can still produce an envy-free and equitable marital property
division at divorce. While the procedure is not perfect, it lowers
the risk of an unfair property division by limiting the effect of
power imbalances between the divorcing spouses.
To analyze the potential for Adjusted Winner to
improve divorce bargaining it is necessary to understand the
current divorce process and the factors that affect it. First, this
Note briefly describes the three methods couples can utilize to
develop a complete divorce agreement. Then the problems that
have been identified in the current process are summarized
and solutions to these problems are proposed. After
establishing this framework, the theoretical background for the
Adjusted Winner technique will be described along with why
its creators believe it can improve divorce bargaining. Then the
18 See Steven J. Brains & Alan D. Taylor, A Procedure for Divorce Settlement,
13 MEDIATION Q. 191 (1996); see also Sarah Boxer, For Birthday Parties or Legal
Parties; Dividing Things Fairly is Not Always a Piece of Cake, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1999, at B7; Larissa MacFarquhar, Dept. of Human Nature: A Souped-Up Pie Chart
Might Put Divorce Lawyers Out of Business, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 16, 1999; Michael
Schrage, I Cut, You Choose: Do You Strive to Be Tough, Yet Fair? Leadership by the
Numbers, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 1999, at 294, available at 1999 WL 7940710; Robert
Uhlig, Divorce Formula Promises Equal Slice of the Cake: American Academics Claim
Simple Math Can Take Stress and Envy Out of Dividing Property, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 15, 1999, at 9, available in 1999 WL 21605986.
19 Envy freeness is achieved when neither party "is willing to give up the
portion he or she receives in exchange for the portion the other party receives". BRAMS
& TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 13. This does not mean that neither party could have
received additional property, but rather that both parties feel they have received as
much or more than the other party. See BRAMs & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 2.
20 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 953 (suggesting that
improving the private bargaining process in divorce will impact over ninety percent of
divorcing couples).
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mechanics of Adjusted Winner are illustrated through an
application to a hypothetical divorce. Lastly, the procedure is
analyzed in reference to the bargaining framework previously
established to highlight its weaknesses and strengths.
I. THE DIVORCE PROCESS
Because divorce, like marriage, is regulated by states,
the process may vary from locale to locale.2' There are two
major distinctions between types of divorce cases: fault and no-
fault. A fault divorce requires the party seeking the divorce to
allege a specific statutory reason justifying a court order
terminating the relationship.22 This is similar to other civil
litigation in which the defendant is given the opportunity to
deny the allegation and the plaintiff bears the burdens of proof
and persuasion. The position of both parties will greatly dictate
the length and cost of litigation. In a no-fault divorce, the party
seeking a divorce is not required to allege any specific reason.'
In most jurisdictions, the state establishes minimum
requirements for obtaining a no-fault divorce, such as a period
of separation or allegations of irreconcilable differences.24
Regardless of the controlling law, whether fault or no-
fault, divorce involves the division of assets, liabilities, and
parenting responsibilities. These tangible and intangible items
21 Compare CAL. FAMi. CODE § 2450 (West Supp. 2000) (permitting the court,
upon stipulation of the parties, to order a case management plan which may include
early neutral case evaluation or alternative dispute resolution) with MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.6(3) (West 1988) (requiring Michigan couples to provide a complaint,
answer, and proof of a breakdown in the marriage relationship so that "there remains
no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved") and N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-4-7.2 (Michie 1999) (permitting married couples in New Mexico to arbitrate division
of property, child support and visitation, alimony, and debt allocation); see also CAL.
FAmi. CODE § 2320 (West Supp. 2000) (granting courts jurisdiction to grant divorce only
in cases in which one party has been a resident for six months).
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 1991) (permitting court to grant
divorce to "innocent and injured spouse whenever it is judged that the other spouse"
has "committed willful and malicious desertion", adultery, or bigamy, or treated
innocent spouse cruelly, been sentenced to prison for two or more years, or made life
burdensome and intolerable for innocent spouse).
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West Supp. 2000) (permitting court to grant
divorce because of irreconcilable differences not specific fault of one party).
24 See id.; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(d) (permitting divorce due to
irretrievable breakdown in marriage only after parties live apart for two years).
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will ultimately be divided by a court order, but many
jurisdictions permit the couple to suggest an appropriate
division." The parties' control over the ultimate division of
assets and liabilities depends on the jurisdiction." When issues
remain, which the couple could not resolve privately, the court
renders a decision resolving the dispute. The guidance
provided to the court by the legislature, and the degree of
discretion the court may utilize, depends on the jurisdiction.
Regarding property division, at one end of the
spectrum are jurisdictions following the community property
scheme. This dictates that assets and liabilities acquired after
marriage are to be divided equally between the husband and
wife.28 Property acquired through gift or inheritance is
considered separate from the community property. The other
extreme is a separate property jurisdiction that does not
recognize that marriage has any affect on property ownership."0
In these jurisdictions, the assets and liabilities are divided
based on who is the title holder.31 Because this could lead to
absurd results, no jurisdiction still follows a pure separate
property scheme. 2
Couples exert their control over the divorce agreement
and process through three methods: settlement, mediation, and
litigation. Settlement discussions in divorce are like other
forms of settlement. Lawyers work privately with their
individual clients to determine what their entitlements are
under the law, what their preferred outcome would be, and
See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKiN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOcIAL AND LEGAL DILEMiAS OF CUSTODY 41 (1992) (finding that, in the absence of
children, divorcing couples generally have the power to negotiate their own divorce
arrangement concerning property division and alimony).
2' See id. (finding that California grants parties the power to make a
privately negotiated agreement binding and outside court jurisdiction); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4-7.2, supra note 21.
27 Compare supra note 8 with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.401 (granting
trial judge discretion to award property as "appears to the court to be equitable under
all the circumstances of the case, if it appears from the evidence in the case that the
party contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the property").
See supra note 5.
See supra note 4.
3" See supra note 3.
3' See supra note 3; see also Wirth v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308
(3rd Dep't 1971).
32 See Bell, supra note 2, at 124 ("Today, no state uses the title system of
property division at divorce.").
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what minimum outcome they are willing to accept.33 Once these
benchmarks are determined, the lawyers begin negotiating.
Depending on the situation, negotiations may include the
clients or be performed between the two lawyers alone. If an
agreement is ultimately reached it will be presented to the
presiding judge for approval. The court will likely approve a
private agreement unless some obvious unfairness exists.3 4 If
no agreement is reached, the parties will prepare themselves
for litigation or another form of court intervention, such as a
court referee or court ordered mediation.
Mediation is similar to settlement discussions with
the addition of a neutral third party facilitator.3' Depending on
the rules of the mediation, lawyers may or may not attend the
mediation sessions with their clients.36 The couple will meet
with the mediator and begin discussing their conflict and
possible resolutions. The mediator's role is to listen to the
parties and help them "restate their concerns and hopes in
ways that keep a variety of options open."37 Mediation requires
both parties to commit to negotiate in good faith and fully
disclose relevant information.38 As with settlement discussions,
See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAMt URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATION TO
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 102-05 (1983) (describing benefits of knowing the
client's best alternative to a negotiated agreement, called BATNA, to better judge a
proposed solution); Gary N. Skoloff, The Art and Craft of Successful Divorce
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATING TO SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1, at 37, 37-38
(considering familiarity with the client and the client's goals a basic principle of
negotiation); Amy Amundsen, Tailoring Divorce Settlement Agreements to Suit the
Parties, 15 MATRIM. STRATEGIST 6 (1997) (recognizing the need for a divorce agreement
that fits the individual needs of each spouse); Mary-Lynne Fisher & Arnold I. Siegel,
Evaluating Negotiation Behavior and Results: Can We Identify What We Say We
Know?, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 395 (1987) (recognizing that when preparing for
negotiation by determining client's needs and goals, priorities should be established so
the negotiator knows which issues can be compromised or conceded).
34 See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits of Private
Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORI 1015 (1985) (finding that even in situations
involving children, courts typically "rubber-stamp" divorce agreements).
3' See W. Patrick Phear, The Dynamics of Mediation, in NEGOTIATING TO
SET"LEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1, at 89, 90 ("Mediation in its most generally
accepted form is a process in which a trained neutral third party helps the disputing
parties come to a mutually satisfactory resolution of their own design.").
36 See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 883 (1997) ("In some places, lawyers routinely
attend mediation sessions; [sic] in other places, lawyers rarely attend.").
37 Phear, supra note 35, at 95.
38 Id. at 90.
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mediation will be most successful when the divorcing couple
remains amicable with each other.
Litigation is the method of last resort. When the
couple is unable to agree through settlement discussions or
mediation, they may turn to the court to decide the matter.
Like other forms of litigation, this may involve submitting
briefs to the court or oral arguments. While most states do not
provide for a jury in divorce litigation,39 some states require the
judge to consider certain factors when making the decision. 0
These laws have been termed "equitable distribution" laws
because the goal is for the judge to divide the assets and
liabilities equitably between the parties, considering certain
specified factors such as the length of the marriage, the role
each party played in the relationship, and the future financial
potential of both parties.
41
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT DIVORCE PROCESSES
There are two problems that may occur in a divorce
agreement: (1) the result may be unfair to one party, and (2)
the divorce may have a negative impact on a third party. A
divorce agreement may appear unfair, either objectively or
subjectively.12 For example, if the wife receives seventy percent
of the marital assets, the result may appear unfair to an
outside observer. The parties may feel this is very fair because
of an imbalance in future income potential. Alternatively, the
assets may be divided evenly between the couple, so an outside
observer, such as the judge, would perceive fairness. However,
"9 See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3323(a) (West 1997) (enabling either
party to request a jury trial to determine any matter of fact); compare MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West 1998).
'0 See NY DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(6)(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.401
(West 1988).
41 See id.
42 See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New
York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 628-
32 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of determining fairness in property division because
of the theory of marriage as an equal partnership must be balanced by reality that
women are not equals in the marketplace) [hereinafter Garrison(2)].
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the wife may believe this agreement is unfair because she has
received primary custody of the children and therefore will
have more expenses."
Obviously, an individual rarely wants an agreement
that favors the other party." Unfair settlement agreements are
likely caused by coercion while unfair court orders are likely
caused by an imbalance in entitlements under the law.45 By
limiting the potential for coercive behavior there should be
fewer unfair divorce agreements. 4 Fewer unfair agreements
equates to more successful private resolutions and less need for
court action to resolve divorce disputes.
Outside the courtroom, one party may coerce the other
by threatening to increase the transaction costs of divorce
unless the other party concedes on some issue or relinquishes
some entitlement under the law. Disparities between the
spouses' abilities to bear the burden of the transaction costs
creates power imbalances; power imbalances create
opportunities for the stronger party to coerce the weaker
party.47 Therefore, equalizing the parties' abilities to bear the
transaction costs should limit opportunities for coercion.
Transaction costs in divorce are present in two forms:
emotional and financial.4' The level of transaction costs will be
determined by the personal history of the couple, the degree of
emotional decision making, and differences between parties'
personal preferences. 49 The degree of strategic behavior,
excessive lawyering, and uncertainty in statutory entitlements
43 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 22 (discussing the economic
strain from divorce resulting from the traditional division of labor in which women
care for the children while men earn the principal income).
44 But cf id. at 102 (recognizing that fathers often accept the custody
arrangement proposed by the mother even when the arrangement is contrary to the
father's desires).
45 The fairness of individual divorce law entitlements is beyond this Note.
41 See Mnookin, supra note 34, at 1024 (finding that if "great disparity in
bargaining power exists, some bargains may arise that are unconscionably one-sided").
47 See id. The party with greater bargaining power is the party who can more
easily bear the burden of the transaction costs.
48 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 971 ("The transaction costs
that the parties must bear may take many forms, some financial and some
emotional."); Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Preparing the Client for Successful Negotiation,
Mediation and Litigation, in NEGOTIATION TO SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1,
at 25, 25 ("The financial costs and emotional litigation costs of the parties and their
children are enormous.").
49 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 966.
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will also affect the level of transaction costs. ° At one extreme
there is an uncontested amicable divorce. Even when the split
is accepted by the husband and wife, both parties will feel some
emotional pain from the termination of their marriage and
drastic changes in their lifestyles.51 Similarly, an amicable
divorce involves some financial costs for court filing fees. While
court filing fees may be minimal, for truly indigent individuals
they may be quite substantial.52
As the hostility in the divorce increases, both the
emotional and financial costs will also increase, because more
time and energy will be required to resolve the issues.53 For
various reasons, parties may begin to argue over what they
once considered trivial matters.54 In preparation for a trial, the
parties may be forced to closely scrutinize their behavior and
their spouse's behavior in the marriage. The longer and more
intense the divorce becomes, the more emotionally taxing it
will be.55 If the negotiations ultimately fail, the financial
transaction costs will further increase as an attorney is
required to litigate the case.
Traditionally, the husband has been in the more
powerful bargaining position at divorce because his social and
financial prospects are greater than those of his wife."6 For
60 See id.
ri Even if the couple's lifestyle has not appeared to change, the
transformation from a married person to an unmarried person is at least equal to the
transformation from an unmarried person to a married person. See MACCOBY &
MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 20 ("Many writers have described the process of
adjustment as an emotionally difficult journey, with predictable stages."); Mnookin,
supra note 34, at 1020 ("[sleparation often brings in its wake psychological turmoil and
substantial emotional distress").
52 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (4th
ed. 1992).
See Mnookin, supra note 34, at 1020-21 (quoting I. Ricci, MOM'S
HOUsEIDAD's HOUSE 70 (1980)). Mnookin mentions the five stages of emotions that
many individuals go through. The emotions of the first three stages can cause an
"otherwise competent person, [to] occasionally have seriously impaired judgment." Id.
at 1020. The third stage, accompanied by nasty emotions, can be the worst time to
make any permanent decisions. Id. at 1021. Mnookin recognizes that this emotional
turmoil "may prevent for a time any negotiated settlement[sic]. Or it may lead to a
settlement that a party later regrets." Id.
"' See Mnookin, supra note 34, at 1020 (the "psychological turmoil and
substantial emotional distress" can jeopardize deliberate and informed decision-
making, as well as creating or exacerbating the risk of legal conflict).
r Social prospect refers to the fact that it is harder for woman to remarry
1348 [Vol. 66: 4
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example, if the husband has built his career while the wife
raised the children, the husband may be better able to bear
financial costs. This will give him the ability to resist an
agreement in the hope that his wife will eventually run out of
money and be forced to agree to an unfavorable property
distribution or alimony award.
In addition, because the transaction costs of
settlement are lower relative to the costs of courtroom
litigation, there is an overall incentive for private bargaining,57
but even this incentive could lead to coercion. For example, if
the wife would be better off with a judicial order because the
statutory scheme favors her, she may pressure her husband to
agree to a more favorable agreement because she has less at
risk in case settlement fails.
While the financial and emotional costs of divorce
bargaining are lower than the costs associated with litigation,
one must ask whether the costs could be even lower. Because
divorce can be so difficult on a family, financially and
emotionally, the state should strive to lower the transaction
costs, thereby easing stress on the family unit." Advocates of
after a divorce because men traditionally marry younger woman. Because men
traditionally marry younger, and conversely woman traditionally marry older, men
have a social advantage after divorce. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOITEN'S QUEST FOR
EcoNo ,c EQUALITY 20 (1988) ("older men tend to marry younger women"); Amy L.
Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is there a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 548 (1998) ("[tlhe loss of value of women on the
marriage market as a function of age is driven by social customs of... men marrying
down in age, education, and earnings" and women marrying up). A woman may feel
that divorce means she will be single for the rest of her life. See id. at 548-49 ("Since
the factors that disadvantage women all correlate with age, the end result is that
divorced women on average find it harder than men to replace their mates, and these
difficulties increase sharply with advancing age."). "The importance to the creation of
unequal marital bargaining power of the difference in remarriage prospects grounded
in the short reproductive life of women should not be underestimated." Id. at 548.
Financial prospects refer to the fact that traditionally, women earn less
income than men. See FUCHS, supra, at 49 ("[Elven in the mid-1980s the average
American woman earned only two-thirds as much as the average man for each hour of
work."). During marriage, the husband often invests energy in the labor market while
the wife often make more marriage specific investments, such as child care. See Wax,
supra, at 546-47 (finding the husband's labor market investment during marriage to be
"portable in the event of divorce," while the wife's investments "often come at the
expense of labor market opportunity costs").
57 See POSNER, supra note 53.
See Mnookin, supra note 34, at 1016 (proposing that the primary goal of
the states in a divorce action should be "to facilitate the process by which the parties
themselves decide the consequences of the divorce"). Mnookin agrees that states should
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privatization of divorce believe that since the marriage
relationship is a recognized area of privacy, the dissolution of
the marriage relationship should similarly be private. 9
Controlling the factors that affect the transaction costs will
reduce the impact transaction costs have on the divorcing
couple, thereby minimizing opportunities for coercion, and
increasing the probability that a divorcing couple may reach a
fair agreement." The factors that should be controlled are
marital roles, emotional decision making, personal preferences
of the couple, strategic behavior, uncertainty of the relevant
legal entitlements, excessive lawyering, and impact on
children.
A. Marital Roles
Imbalances in divorce bargaining may also be linked
to the couple's developed roles. 1 For example, if the husband
always made the financial decisions in the marriage, it may be
regulate the private bargaining process in divorce to "provide an efficient and fair
mechanism for enforcing such agreements, and for settling disputes when the parties
are unable to agree." Id. at 1019. Until recently states made an effort to make divorce
difficult. See id. at 1015 (finding that before the divorce reform movement, "divorce law
attempted to restrict private ordering severely . . . by [defining] when divorce was
appropriate, [structuring] the economic relationship of the spouses, and [regulating]
their relationship to their children"); see also Roberta F. Benjamin, The Four-Way
Negotiation Conference, in NEGOTIATING TO SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1, at
47, 47 ("Unlike parties to a typical business transaction or civil litigation, parties to a
divorce continue to be involved with each other in varying degrees after the legal issues
have been laid to rest.").
" See Singer, supra note 6, at 1506-07 ("Proponents view the private nature
of mediation as appropriately enhancing party control and as furthering the policy of
minimum state intervention in the family.").
'o See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power:
Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1447, 1448 (1992) ("While the dynamics of power and negotiation are always
uncertain and difficult to chart, most contemporary theorists ... realize that power is
always involved and institutionally in processes of interaction.") (quotations omitted);
but cf H. Joseph Gitlin, Negotiation Settlements of Property, Alimony and Child
Support, in NEGOTIATING TO SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1, at 111, 111 ("The
primary way to gain leverage is to demonstrate to the other side the strengths and
justifiability of your negotiating positions and your ability to take the case to trial if
necessary.").
G' See Singer, supra note 6, at 1542 (describing studies of conversations
between men and women who knew each other which showed that male dominance
through monopolization of speaking time and frequent interruptions was so
commonplace that a trained mediator may not detect the imbalance).
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difficult for the wife to take on this decision-making role for
herself.12 This inexperience may force her to rely on her
attorney more, raising her transaction costs. Similarly, it may
be the wife who maintains contact with family and friends,
leaving the husband with less of a support network during the
divorce process, making it more difficult for him to bear the
emotional cost. These marital roles will not suddenly terminate
when the couple decides to divorce, but rather the roles will
continue to impact the couple's actions in relation to each other
and the world.63 A new divorce procedure should minimize the
negative effects of marital roles, equalizing power between the
spouses.
B. Emotional Decision Making
Combining the emotions of the divorcing couple with
the business mentality of negotiation or litigation can lead to
problems. Economists and legal scholars have proposed two
models to predict how individuals make decisions with regard
to the law. The first model, called rational choice, holds that
decisions are made to maximize personal benefits from a
limited number of resources." An example of this behavior can
be found in ordinary retail commerce. The seller loses an item
of property in exchange for profit, thereby increasing her
overall economic well-being. A buyer will only purchase an
item when he believes the value of the item exceeds the money
required to acquire it, thereby maximizing his economic well-
being. The decision by the parties to proceed with the
12 See Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement
Negotiations, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 932. Professor Bryan suggests that if the
husband has controlled the marital finances, the wife may too easily accept his
valuation of the assets. See id. Furthermore, the wife "may lack the knowledge needed
for successful financial negotiations." Id.
See id. at 932 ("The roles each spouse played during the marriage and their
respective spheres of authority within the marriage can exacerbate the problems
created by the wife's financial dependency."); Lynn D. Feiger & Alan D. Feiger, Clients'
Emotional Problems in Dissolution of Marriage Cases, THE COLORADO LAWYER, June
1976, reprinted in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COUNSELING ASPECTS OF MARITAL
DISSOLUTION 4, 6 (California Continuing Educ. of the Bar eds., 1979); Leatherberry,
supra note 48, at 32 (stressing the need for attorneys to actively listen to the client
because it will encourage the client to make his or her own decisions).
r4 See POSNER, supra note 53.
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transaction is therefore a rational choice based on a common
desire to maximize personal wealth.65
The second model, behavioral choice, attempts to
account for the characteristics of humanity that deviate from
the rational choice model.66 An example of behavioral choice is
an individual's decision to tip a waiter in an out of town
restaurant that the individual will never visit again." The
rational choice model predicts that the individual will balance
the cost of the tip against the benefits of leaving the tip.
Ordinarily the benefit of leaving a tip for a waiter is to induce
better service during the next visit. In the traveling situation,
the potential benefit of leaving a tip is nonexistent because
there will be no next time. Rationally, the cost of the tip
outweighs the benefits. Thus, under the rational choice model,
no tip should be left.68 The behavioral choice model accounts for
6 A principle of the rational choice model is that "resources tend to gravitate
toward their most valuable uses." See id. at 11. In our example, this means that the
item for sale will gravitate toward the buyer, since the buyer will get more utility out
of the item than the seller. The seller will get more utility out of the money than the
property itself. This is evident by the fact that the buyer values the property higher
than the money required to purchase it, while the seller values the money higher than
the item itself.
6 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (stating theory that behavioral economics model can
predict human behavior regarding decision making with more accuracy than the
traditional rational choice model).
67 See id. at 1492 ("People will often behave in accordance with fairness
considerations even when it is against their financial self-interest and no one will
know.").
. Judge Posner suggests an alternative analysis which predicts that the
actor will leave a tip even though it appears to provide no objective benefits. See
Richard A. Posner, Rational Chwice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1561-64 (1998). He suggests that fairness as a motivational factor is a
result of biological evolution and should not be analyzed any differently than other
forms of altruism. See id. Rational choice theory easily explains many examples of
altruism by recognizing the interdependence of individuals. If Wr. A's welfare is linked
to Mr. B's, then Mr. A will be motivated to act in ways to increase Mr. B's welfare. See
id. at 1556. Judge Posner explains altruism as a biological trait that originated to
ensure "maximizing the number of copies of one's genes by maximizing the number of
creatures carrying them." Id. at 1561. In humans, this optimization will occur through
helping one's relatives. See id. In prehistoric times, humans lived in small groups
comprised of relatives or non-relatives closely linked to the family. See Posner, supra at
1561. In this society, one would maximize their genetic offspring by helping everyone.
See id. Judge Posner suggests that as our societies have evolved to include many
genetic strangers, our motivation to help others in our society has not changed. See id.
at 1563. Thus, fairness is an instinctual decision to increase one's own self-interests.
Id.
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the apparent irrationality of the decision to leave the tip by
recognizing that people may be motivated by other
considerations, such as fairness. 9
While negotiation assumes rational actors, people in
divorce do not always make decisions under the standard
rational choice model."0 Divorce is an emotional time and
decisions will likely be affected accordingly. 1 People may be
motivated by spite, guilt, depression, greed, revenge, or love,
rather than their own self-interest.72 While divorce bargaining
allows the parties greater freedom to develop an individualized
resolution of their divorce disputes, it also gives individuals
more freedom to act emotionally rather than rationally.
As emotions increase, transaction costs will similarly
increase. Negotiations may require more time because the
parties may disagree on more issues." Lawyers may work more
hours to manage their clients more actively.14 Similarly, as the
possibility of a private agreement decreases, the risk of
courtroom litigation increases. 5 Because divorce is such an
c' See Jolls et. al, supra note 66, at 1479 (predicting that a result of fairness
concerns in the behavior choice model will be actors behaving nicer or meaner,
depending on how they are treated by other actors).
71 See MACCOBY & MOOKIN, supra note 25, at 54-55 ("The strong emotions
attending the spousal divorce may pose a formidable barrier to collaborative, cool, and
rational problem-solving.").
71 See id. at 20-21 (explaining that the period surrounding separation is
marked by an eruption of emotions which may cause people to act in "exaggerated and
uncharacteristic ways" which can jeopardize decision making); Leatherberry, supra
note 48, at 29.
2 See IMIACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 21 (explaining how the divorce
initiator often feels guilt for leaving, while the other spouse often feels anger and rage);
see also ESTHER OSHIVER FISHER, DIVORCE: THE NEW FREEDOM 35 (1974) (comparing
the emotions at divorce to the emotions from the death of a spouse).
73 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 55.
74 See Leatherberry, supra note 48, at 29 (recognizing the importance of
communicating to the client that his or her feelings are as significant as the legal facts
because it will initiate more open communication enabling the lawyer to better
understand the client's immediate needs in order to effectively begin addressing them).
Leatherberry further suggests that if a lawyer stifles an emotional outburst too
quickly, this may lengthen the duration of the outburst or transfer any negative
emotions, originally directed at the client's spouse, to the lawyer. Id. at 30; see also
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 60, at 1455 ("the lawyer's professional skills may be
severely tested by the client's guilt about marriage failure, [or] unresolved feelings for
the spouse").
7' See MACCOBY & MNOOMIN, supra note 25, at 21 (stating that the
substantial emotional hardship of divorce can create or exacerbate the risk of legal
conflict).
20011 1353
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
emotional event, it is difficult to separate emotional concerns
from financial concerns. 6 For example, the wife may feel a
stronger emotional need for custody because it will be more
difficult for her to conceive additional children after the
divorce." The husband may feel less emotional need, since his
ability to conceive children is much less affected by divorce. 8
These emotions may enable the husband to take advantage of
his wife's vulnerability by threatening to fight for custody
unless the wife sacrifices some financial asset.7" One goal of a
new procedure should be to prevent these types of negative
effects resulting from emotional decision making.
C. Personal Preferences
When a husband and wife are dividing their assets, as
their personal preferences for an asset diverge, the probability
of reaching an agreement will increase. Suppose, a couple must
divide a small pool of assets consisting of the marital home and
sail boat. The wife desires only the home, while the husband
desires only the boat. In this situation, the spouse's preferences
are perfectly opposite. The couple could efficiently utilize these
assets by agreeing on a division in which the wife receives the
marital home and the husband receives the boat."0 This
76 See Benjamin, supra note 58, at 47 (explaining that divorce negotiation
requires special skills because the disputes are so "heavily laden with intense emotions
and the issues strike at the most private and vulnerable of human concerns").
See Wax supra note 56.
78 See id.
7D Mnookin and Maccoby suggest that this form of coercion does not occur. See
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 155-56. In their study, there was no financial
impact from mothers who were required to negotiate to achieve their custody desire
than mothers who easily achieved their custody desire. See id. One explanation they
offer is that the anecdotal evidence makes the threat of coercion implicit in all divorce
bargaining whether the father expresses this or not. See id. at 156. Another
explanation offered was that the group studied, California couples, benefited from high
certainty regarding custody and financial entitlements. See id. at 157. Because the law
was certain there was no way to coerce the mother into accepting a lower financial
reward in exchange for greater custody. See id. In the end, it is still unclear whether
fathers will use custody as a threat to force the mother into accepting a lower financial
share of the marital assets.
so See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; see also Ann Laquer Estin,
Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 531-35
(1995) (analyzing proposals to permit only divorce consented to by both partners in
terms of Pareto efficiency). Looking at divorce economically, a rational decision to
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example shows how the probability of achieving a Pareto
superior resolution" increases as the divergence in personal
preferences increases.
This issue is especially relevant in divorce bargaining
because personal preferences are not always motivated by a
rational desire to increase economic well-being. Preferences of
a divorcing couple may be motivated by various emotions.8 2 For
instance, the husband may have a desire for the marital home,
not because he truly wants ownership but merely to prevent
his wife from receiving ownership. As the couple's preferences
overlap, the need for negotiation will increase. Ultimately, if
the couple's preferences are perfectly similar, they may be
unable to agree, requiring court resolution. A goal of a new
divorce procedure should be to take full advantage of
differences in a divorcing couple's preferences while
minimizing conflict when preferences overlap.
D. Strategic Behavior
The goal of strategic behavior is to gain an advantage
in the bargaining process by utilizing information about the
other party. Strategic behavior can lead one party to bluff, lie,
or threaten, in hopes of persuading the other side to accept
less.? Strategic behavior requires knowledge of the other
party's preferences, the other party's risk preferences and
ability to bear transaction costs, and some knowledge of the
expected outcome if negotiation fails and litigation is
necessary.'
divorce means the individual believes there is greater value in being single than
remaining married, taking into consideration all relevant emotional and financial
factors. See id. at 534. If the state required both parties to consent to the divorce, that
would ensure that neither party would be less off after the divorce. See id.
81 A Pareto superior solution occurs when neither party is worse off and at
least one party is better off. See POSNER, supra note 53; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 9, at 973-74 ("opportunities for making both [parties] better off through a
negotiated agreement will exist to the extent that parental preferences differ"). For a
full discussion of Pareto optimal divorce resolutions, see Estin, supra note 80.
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 968 ("[Olne can easily imagine
preferences that reflect spite and envy."). Mnookin and Kornhauser also recognize that
parents may be motivated by altruistic concerns for their children, not merely anger or
spite towards the other parent. See id.
83 See id. at 972-73.
84 See id.
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Strategic behavior in divorce poses a special threat
because negotiating parties in divorce were once in an intimate
relationship and will know a great deal about each other. This
knowledge can be helpful or harmful." If both parties are
equally aware of the other's preferences, there may be a
beneficial effect. Rather than use the knowledge against each
other, they could use the knowledge to quickly divide the assets
based on their preferences.86 Alternatively, both parties could
attempt to use strategy to maximize their share of the assets."7
How parties choose to use their knowledge may
depend on the divorce process they choose. A mediator may
prevent this type of strategic behavior by working with the
parties to state their individual settlement goals without
reference to the other party and by assisting the parties to
realize the benefits of working together in developing a divorce
agreement.88  Furthermore, since mediation requires both
parties to negotiate in good faith, individuals who insist on
strategic behavior may simply refuse to mediate.
In settlement discussions, no neutral role exists. The
lawyers and clients decide how to frame the discussion and use
the available information. 9 The participants are free to behave
85 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 509, 514
(1994) (recognizing the opportunity and limits of using knowledge strategically when
resolving a two party dispute).
6 See id. at 542-43 ("Cooperative divorce lawyers... as intermediaries may
be able to create gains that the spouses could not realize alone."); Singer, supra note 6,
at 1502 (suggesting that mediation can resolve conflict with "gains to both parties, as
well as to children" because cooperative solutions are not limited to one side winning
and the other side losing).
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 543 (recognizing the danger of
cooperative moves if not reciprocated by the other side). Gilson and Mnookin suggest
that a "reputational network" exists among family law practitioners, so cooperative
and uncooperative attorneys are easily identified. See id. at 543-48.
See Singer, supra note 6, at 1502 ("mediation reduces hostility and
minimizes divorce-related trauma.., by facilitating direct communication between the
parties and by converting disputes that the adversary system tends to present as zero-
sum conflicts into problems that can be solved with gains to both parties"); Andrew S.
Watson, Mediation and Negotiation: Learning to Deal with Psychological Responses, 18
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 293, 294 (1985) ("The mediator stands between the parties,
asserting no position of his own but, rather, drawing from them a solution that the
parties and others perceive as fair and equitable."); see also supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 545 (finding that in northern
California population studied a substantial amount of selection occurs between clients
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strategically, only limited by their ability to bear the resulting
increase in transaction costs. 9 If the parties are able to
cooperate, time, money, and effort will be saved and the
parties' satisfaction with the agreement will increase.91
Conversely, a party utilizing strategic behavior risks a
failure in the negotiations, requiring litigation to resolve their
dispute.92 The degree of strategic behavior will largely depend
on the couple's individual risk preferences.93 Individuals may
be risk averse, risk neutral, or risk preferrers. 9' Someone who
is risk averse would rather accept a known agreement than
risk an unknown adjudication, while a person who prefers risk
will rather gamble on an unknown adjudication rather than
accept a known agreement.95 A risk neutral person reacts to
risk with behavior in between theses two extremes.96 For
example, if a husband is risk averse and his wife is a risk
preferrer and there is a high degree of uncertainty, the
husband will have a greater incentive to reach a private
agreement. This may enable the wife, the risk preferrer, to
achieve a better agreement for herself by strategically taking
advantage of her husband's aversion to risk. The husband must
not only consider the outcome of the negotiation if he concedes
to the threat, but also the litigation outcome if he does not.
This will increase the husband's transaction costs, further
persuading him to agree to his wife's proposal. A priority of a
new divorce procedure should be to discourage strategic
behavior and create incentives for cooperation.
and attorneys, so cooperative attorneys work with cooperative spouses, while
adversarial spouses hired adversarial attorneys).
"0 See id. at 546 (quoting an attorney who accused an adversary of routinely
taking unreasonable positions and going to court too often). Mediation proponents
believe substitution of mediation for more adversarial forms of dispute resolution will
result in significant cost savings to couples. See Singer, supra note 6, at 1503.
Cooperative settlement negotiations between lawyers could similarly result in cost
savings.
91 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 541 (suggesting there are
opportunities to increase value to both parties and improve the outcome of a divorce
settlement, if clients and attorneys cooperate).
92 The risk inherent in litigation will depend on the uncertainty of the
relevant divorce law. See infra Part II.E.
93 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 971-72.
4 See id. at 971.05 See id.
O0 See id.
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E. Uncertainty of Legal Entitlements
Entitlements under the law will determine the
minimum that each party will accept through bargaining.97 "In
other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no
agreement is reached gives each [party] bargaining chips-an
endowment of sorts."98 For example, in a community property
jurisdiction, where the law requires a judge to divide the
marital property evenly between the couple, neither individual
will likely agree to a divorce settlement that gives them less
than half the property. When entitlements are less clear, both
parties become less aware of their bottom line positions.
Similarly, each party will be less aware of the other party's
bottom line, increasing the chance of proposing unacceptable
solutions. It also becomes harder to evaluate a proposal in
reference to one's unknown bottom line position. Equitable
distribution laws trade an increase in uncertainty of
entitlements for more judicial discretion in order to ensure
fairness.99
Strategic behavior will be more effective and subtly
encouraged as entitlements become more vague." Because a
bluff or threat cannot be evaluated properly if the law
regarding the outcome is unclear, there is a higher chance of
succeeding through these tactics. This may result in "a game of
chicken,"' in which both parties get carried away with
strategic behavior, ending up in court. 102 In this context,
entitlements under the law can be viewed as establishing a
07 See FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at 104 ("The reason you negotiate is to
produce something better than the results you can obtain without negotiating.");
Benjamin, supra note 58, at 52 ("Most important, the attorney should analyze the
range of proposals against the backdrop of the likely outcome were the case to be
tried.").
8Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 968.
See Garrison(l), supra note 1, at 512 ("[J]udges have failed to achieve
predictable and consistent outcomes in many areas of divorce decision making
[deriving] from the novelty of the statutory provisions [in N.Y.] coupled with the
conflicting, and at times incoherent, principles upon which judges have been directed
to base the decision-making process.").
"0 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
'o' Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 975 (internal quotations omitted).
102 See id.
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framework within which the bargaining couple can negotiate
comfortably." 3
In an effort to balance uncertainty and fairness, many
states adopted equitable distribution laws which permit a
judge to divide the assets at his or her discretion, often after
considering a specific list of factors.' Compared to the
community property or common law rules, granting the judge
discretion to divide the assets increases the level of
uncertainty, but also prevents absurd results."5 The debate
concerning the merits of judicial discretion in divorce disputes
is ongoing.0 6
Marsha Garrison. 7 performed an extensive empirical
study to analyze the level of predictability in New York state
divorce cases under the current equitable distribution law.'8
Concerning marital property distribution, she found less
variation in litigation outcomes than in settlement outcomes. 9
Looking at the data more closely, Professor Garrison found no
pattern emerging."0 She suggests that the variations are due to
private values of individual judges, not the analysis of the
statutory factors."'
'3 See id at 950 (suggesting that divorce law provides a "framework within
which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and
responsibilities"); see also FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at 102-04 (discussing the
benefits of establishing a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (or "BATNA")
before begnning negotiations).
See, e.g., N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 236B(1) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1999)
(keeping premarital property, gifts, inheritances, and personal injury awards separate
from marital property for purposes of distribution as a result of divorce); MCH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.401 (West 1988) (granting trial judge discretion to award property as
"appears to the court to be equitable under all the circumstances of the case, if it
appears from the evidence in the case that the party contributed to the acquisition,
improvement, or accumulation of the property").
,s See, e.g., Wirth v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1971).
10' See Garrison(1), supra note 1, at 411.
107 Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1*8 See Garrison(1), supra note 1, at 430 (analyzing approximately 900
divorces from 1978 and an additional 900 from 1984, four years after the passage of
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B).
"o She found that Judges tend toward an equal distribution norm. See id. at
455. She also found that "settlement outcomes were highly disparate and widely
distributed along a zero to one hundred percent scale." Id. at 452.
"o Id. at 505 ("Depending on which economic decision we take as an example,
evidence can be found to support the claims of either discretion's critics or its
champions.").
. Id. at 506 ("Discretion thus sometimes produced outcomes that appear to
rely more on private values than on public standards.").
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For a divorcing couple, this study provides a mixed
message. If they resort to litigation, the property division is
likely to be near equal.112 However, divorcing couples are left
without any reliable method to predict how the division in their
particular case will deviate from an equal division.'13 One way
to solve this problem is to generate new rules for property
division."' Another way to resolve this problem, or at least ease
the parties' burden, is to utilize a bargaining system which
limits the effect that the law will have in the decision-making
process. 115
F. Excessive Lawyering
Lawyers play a special role in the divorce bargaining
arena. They act as emotional counselors,'16 role models,'
financial advisers,"' as well as legal counselors."' At every step
in the negotiation process, lawyers can either facilitate or
frustrate.20 Normally, attorneys will help the client determine
12 See Garrison(l), supra note 1, at 455.
See id. at 505-06 ("Judges seem to agree on relatively equal division as a
prototypical outcome, but do not appear to have reached sufficient consensus on the
factors that justify departure from equal division, to permit reliable outcome
predictions.").
,' See id at 517-18 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages to a divorce
system more reliant on rules rather than judicial discretion).
1 Cf Id. at 416 (finding evidence to suggest that current divorce litigants
"frequently reach settlement decisions with little awareness of, or concern for, legal
norms").
,,, See Lea therberry, supra note 48, at 25 (recognizing that the lawyer may
play the role of therapist in divorce counseling and as the client progresses through
stages of divorce the lawyer should respond accordingly).
117 See Benjamin, supra note 58, at 47 (suggesting that lawyers serve as role
models for their clients in conflict resolution); Liebman, supra note 1, at 21 ("Lawyers
teach their clients a great deal about how to dispute and how to negotiate.").
"8 See Gitlin, supra note 60, at 115 ("A major consideration in setting levels of
alimony and child support is the tax consequence to each party.").
"" For a general discussion of the multiple functions lawyers play in the
divorce bargaining, see Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 985.
120 See id. at 986 ("Lawyers may make negotiations more adversarial and
painful, and thereby make it more difficult and costly for the spouses to reach
agreement."); FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at 112-33 (describing tactics a cooperative
lawyer can employ when confronted with an adversarial lawyer in the negotiation
context); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 542-43 ("Cooperative divorce lawyers
may [1 provide an escape: by credibly committing their clients to cooperate, the lawyers
as intermediaries may be able to create gains that the spouses could not realize
alone."); Liebman, supra note 1, at 20 (finding that adversarial lawyers may prolong
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what he or she wants and what he or she is willing to
concede.'2' The attorneys will also develop the negotiation
strategy, choosing between the cooperative or adversarial
approach.122 These are crucial activities in any negotiation, and
possibly more important in divorce negotiation." The choices
each attorney makes will have significant consequences on the
overall success of the negotiation.'" In addition, negotiation
often occurs between the two lawyers, who later communicate
updates to their respective clients, which can lead to
communication problems, rumors, and confusion."
the divorce bargaining process unnecessarily by negotiating over issues that are not
important to the ultimate settlement).
121 See Liebman, supra note 1, at 20 ("In a problem-solving negotiation, the
lawyers would identify their clients' interest... [to] see opportunities for a variety of
[solutions]"); Skoloff, supra note 33, at 37 (stating that proper representation means
that the attorney understands the client's goals).
12 See Skoloff, supra note 33 at 39 (recognizing that establishing a negotiation
plan based on the client's goal is important to success).
'2 Most negotiation occurs between businessmen who are experienced in the
process. Divorce often involves two people who are completely inexperienced in
negotiation. See Benjamin, supra note 58, at 53 ("no matter how sophisticated, [the
client] will [generally] be wholly inexperienced in this sort of negotiation"). This
inexperience can lead to inefficiencies. See id. at 56 (suggesting that attorney's in
negotiations sessions with the clients have a responsibility to focus on problem-solving,
because clients will likely continue to bring up past conflicts).
124 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAb URY, GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATION TO
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 134 (1983). If one attorney decides to be combative,
while the other chooses to be cooperative, a power imbalance will result affecting the
equity of the agreement. See Liebman, supra note 1, at 19 (suggesting that a combative
attorney may miss opportunities to generate gains for both clients); Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 986 (finding that lawyers may make negotiations more
adversarial and thereby more costly, or they may make "negotiations more rational,
minimize the number of disputes, discover outcomes preferable to both parties, [and]
increase the opportunities for resolution out of court").
=n This is similar to the children's game "telephone" where a group of children
line up and a message is whispered from child to child. The game is fun because the
message is inadvertently changed along the line of children. When this happens
between two adults undergoing a divorce, it is not fun. See Craig A. Mcewen et. al.,
Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in
Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1380 (1995) (describing the benefits of face
to face discussions in which the spouses and lawyers are present as there are fewer
communication problems arising because messages must be passed through lawyers,
fewer rumors, and the client maintains greater control over decision making); Edward
M. Ginsburg, The Settlement Process-The View From the Bench, in NEGOTIATING TO
SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1, at 71 (describing the benefits of face to face
negotiations with the clients present, suggesting that this type of meeting is "almost
always productive").
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It is generally agreed that cooperative, rather than
combative negotiations are more efficient,126 lead to better
results,127  and require lower transaction costs. 12  Divorcing
couples can impact the negotiation atmosphere by choosing
cooperative attorneys, or utilizing a mediator. 129 Difficulties
may still arise if both spouses do not wish to be cooperative.O0
Some recent literature has proposed that non-adversarial
bargaining can be more efficient and lead to better results, but
not all attorneys have adopted the problem-solving
technique.'31 Similarly, not all mediators agree on how to
handle power imbalances between the parties.3 2 An agreement
12G See Liebman, supra note 1, at 15 ("it seems more difficult to be an effective
negotiator using a competitive style"). Liebman suggests that the ineffectiveness of
combative negotiators arises from the higher risk of a negotiation breakdown,
inappropriately linking issues, and ignoring the client's emotions. See id at 19-20.127• See FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at 73 (stressing benefit of developing
mutually advantageous solutions, rather than viewing negotiation as zero-sum game,
in which a gain for one party means a loss for the other party); Gilson & Mnookin,
supra note 85, at 542 ("in many circumstances, cooperation [in divorce bargaining] can
create value and improve the outcome from each party's point of view") (internal
quotations omitted); Skoloff, supra note 33, at 39 (finding that combative negotiation
style can "spell disaster" because parties will be less able to resolve future conflicts).
128 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 542; Singer, supra note 6, at 1502
("by facilitating direct communication between the parties and by converting disputes
that the adversary system tends to present as a zero-sum conflicts into problems that
can be solved with gains to both parties").
121 See Lande, supra note 36, at 889 ("Mediation can ] offer a useful forum for
lawyers who want to use a problem-solving approach to negotiation", rather than a
combative approach); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 545 (suggesting that there
is a great deal of "sorting and self-selection" among divorce lawyers and clients, so
clients wishing a cooperative negotiation approach selected lawyers who shared this
attitude); Singer, supra note 6, at 1502 (finding that proponents of mediation argue
that mediation reduces hostility and minimizes emotional trauma to spouses and
children by "converting disputes that the adversary system tends to present as zero-
sum conflicts into problems that can be solved with gains to both parties, as well as to
children").
130 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 545 (discussing difficulty
cooperative attorneys often face when representing a client whose spouse chose a
combative attorney); Singer, supra note 6, at 1541-42 (suggesting that mediation may
be ineffective to control power imbalances that exist between the parties).
131 See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 85, at 545; Skoloff, supra note 33,
at 43 ("Threats can be used in resolving disputes.").
132 See Phear, supra note 35, at 90 (finding that the current standards of
mediation practice prohibits the mediator from providing advice to the parties, which
"makes it essential that the parties have access to outside advisers"); Mcewen et al.,
supra note 125, at 1323-25 (discussing the debate over the fairness of mediation,
referring to critics' claims that mediators themselves may coerce a weak party and
proponents' claims that properly trained mediators can compensate for power
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facilitated by an ill-trained mediator may encompass a higher
transaction cost than an agreement negotiated between two
experienced and trained attorneys.133 Because of the risk
inherent in a combative agreement, a new divorce process
should encourage lawyers and clients to negotiate
cooperatively, while limiting the influence of a lawyer or client
who wishes to be combative.
G. Impact on Children3 .
When two parties negotiate combatively, they may
forget about the impact on their children, family, and friends.135
During the divorce proceedings, child custody and child care
expenses may become bargaining chips in the negotiation. 36
Whether parents actually trade financial rights for custody is
not clear.13 ' Even if such trades are not common, when they do
occur, evidence suggests that child support agreements are
negatively affected.'38 Also, when resolving custody conflicts,
judges utilize the "best interest of the child standard" which
imbalances between the parties); Singer, supra note 6, at 1542 ("Considerable
disagreement [exists within the mediation community about whether, and how, a
mediator should attempt to remedy power imbalances.").
1"3 See Mcewen et al., supra note 125, at 1343 ("Now, the quality or fairness of
mediation is treated as a direct product of the mediator"); Singer, supra note 6, at 1503
(finding that if mediation fails to resolve all conflict, traditional negotiation or court
proceedings will be necessary, eliminating any potential time savings).
134 While this paper does not focus on the impact to third parties, it would be
prudent to briefly discuss the issue.
135 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 24 (emphasizing that
rearranging the parental roles is greatly complicated by the simultaneous redefinition
of each spouse's financial and emotional situation).
"' See Singer, supra note 6, at 1550 ("common divorce bargaining practice of a
parent trading off financial claims for custody assurances").
137 Maccoby and Mnookin suggest these tradeoffs do not occur. See MACCOBY
& MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 152-54 (suggesting mothers are more likely than fathers
to receive the custody arrangement they desire because fathers fail to voice their
custody desire); but see Bryan, supra note 62, at 936-37 (suggesting that wives, due to
limited finances, often hire lawyers who fail to give their case the attention necessary,
often coercing them into an unfair agreement); James T. Friedman, Negotiating Child
Custody Cases, in NEGOTIATING TO SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE, supra note 1, at 133, 133
("some spouses will not hesitate to take an arbitrary or aggressive stance on custody or
visitation issues to create settlement leverage for property and support issues"). Singer
suggests these tradeoffs are commonplace. See Singer, supra note 6, at 1550.
'33 See Singer, supra note 6, at 1550.
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provides little guidance for couples to bargain privately."9
Thus, when child custody arrangements are added to the list of
issues requiring resolution, the bargaining dynamics become
significantly more complex, making it more difficult to reach a
private agreement.
140
Once a divorce agreement has been reached, whether
through private negotiations or court proceedings, the parents
must still work together to raise the child.' 1 During the divorce
process, one parent may have formed a "parental alliance"
142
with the child to exclude the other parent.' A child's respect
for parental authority may be weakened after viewing parental
conflicts.'" Similarly, evidence suggests that parental conflict
may lower the behavior standards for the children. 14 Recent
evidence also suggests that the psychological effect of divorce
on the couple's children lasts longer and is more serious than
previously believed.'46 A new procedure must not fail to
consider the impact divorce will have on a couple's children. To
lessen a negative impact, a new procedure should limit
parental conflicts and assist couples to separate the financial
issues from the parental issues, preventing the use of custody
threats.
III. THE ADJUSTED WINNER PROCEDURE
To ensure fairness in real-life dispute resolution,
Steven J. Brains and Alan D. Taylor developed Adjusted
Winner.47 They began by looking at the simple problem of
139 See id.; Bryan, supra note 62, at 934 ("The 'best interest of the child'
standard is so indeterminate as to be no standard at all."); see also supra Part III.E.
14 See MACCOBY & MNooKIN, supra note 25, at 24-25; Friedman, supra note
137, at 133 ("The attorney has to undertake a unique burden in negotiating child
custody cases.").See MACCOBY & MNOOK!N, supra note 25, at 24-25 ("the parents will need
to deal with each other as co-parents, even though they are no longer spouses").
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 24 ("If parents quarrel openly
in front of children,... the atmosphere of mutual respect that underlies their joint
authority... is seriously weakened.").
141 See id. ("as the parental alliance weakens, the behavior standards for the
children decline").
14G See Singer, supra note 6, at 1550.
147 See Brams & Taylor, supra note 18, at 191.
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dividing a piece of cake between two parties."' They applied
game theory principles "9 to predict the strategies two parties
would consider under different division schemes.' Adjusted
Winner was developed to mitigate the risk of strategic behavior
during negotiations, in an effort to guarantee the creation of an
agreement that both parties would consider equitable.' 51
According to Brains and Taylor, objective equity is less
important than subjective equity.5 2 If both parties perceive
their share of the division to be equal to or larger than the
other party's share, there will be no envy and the division is
equitable. Brains and Taylor claim that their new procedure
can be used in divorce bargaining to achieve an envy free,
equitable result.''
148 Brams and Taylor analyzed the simple divide and choose algorithm in the
context of two individuals splitting a piece of cake. See BRAMS & TAYLOR(l), supra note
14, at 8. This system requires one party to divide the goods into two separate groups.
See id at 9. The second party chooses which group he will take and the first party
receives the other group. See id.
149 See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
(1994); THOMIAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 213-26 (1984).
'5o See BRAMS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 7-8.151 Brains and Taylor explain that their "approach to fair division is distinctive
... in elevating the property of 'envy-freeness,' and algorithms that generate envy-free
allocations, to a central place in the study of fair division." BRAMS & TAYLOR(I), supra
note 14, at 1. They later explain how a Pareto superior solution can fail to be envy-free.
An envy-free solution guarantees that neither party will envy the other, but does not
guarantee that both parties receive maximum utility from the division. See id. at 2 n.2.
A Pareto superior analysis focuses on what parties receive, rather than how parties
perceive their portion of the division relative to the other party's portion. See id.
112 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 193. Brains and Taylor explain the
relationship between envy-free and equitable:
Note that envy-freeness and equitability both address the question of
whether one player believes he or she did as well as the other player.
The difference is that envy-freeness involves a comparison based on a
personal valuation, which is captured by the following question: Are
you better off with your allocation and, hence, would not desire to
swap with the other player? Equitability, on the other hand involves
an interpersonal comparison: Is your valuation of what you received
equal to the other player's valuation of what he or she received?
Id.
'0 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18; see also Boxer, supra note 18;
MacFarquhar, supra note 18; Schrage, supra note 18; Uhlig, supra note 18.
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A. Game Theory Principles
Game theory is a combination of mathematics,
sociology, and psychology, which attempts to model different
interpersonal interactions to predict how people will react."M In
the legal context, game theory has been utilized by legal
scholars to better understand corporations,155 international
negotiations,"6  torts settlement,' labor relations,"8  and
contract law.'59 In game theory, different interactions are
modeled into games or puzzles and then solved for the best
solution. The basic elements of a game are (1) the actors, (2)
the consequences of different choices, and (3) the strategies
available. 6 ' An example of a game theory model is the well-
known prisoner's dilemma in which two alleged accomplices
are arrested and separated by the police for questioning." The
district attorney cannot convict either of them without
extracting at least one confession, meaning that if both
suspects remain silent, neither will go to jail.16' The district
attorney tells both suspects that if they provide information
implicating the other suspect, the informant will receive no jail
time. If they provide no information but the other suspect
implicates them, the one who was silent will receive a sentence
of ten years in jail. If both suspects confess, implicating each
other, they will both receive sentences of five years in jail. This
154 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 149; Martin Shubik, Symposium-Just
Winners and Losers: The Application of Game Theory to Corporate Law and Practice:
Game Theory, Law and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 2, 285 (1991)
(explaining that the study of game theory is essentially the study of the basic elements
of"conflict and cooperation").
'r5 See Shubik, supra note 154, at 285; Joseph Kattan & William R. Vigdor,
Application of Game Theory to Antitrust: Game Theory and the Analysis of Collusion in
Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 441, 442 (1997).
'rr See Moshe Hirsh, Game Theory, International Law, and Future
Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 (1998).
'57 See BAIRD ET. AL., supra note 149, at 6-28 (comparing game theory models
of negligence and strict liability).
8 See id. at 237.
19 See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990).
160 See BAIRD ETAL., supra note 149, at 8.
161 See id.
162 See id.
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collection of choices and consequences can be modeled in the
matrix shown in Figure L"1
Suspect B
Confess Silence
Suspect A Confess 5,5 0,10
Silence 10,0 0,0
Figure 1. Model of the prisoner's dilemma game, showing the choices
available to both players, and the jail time in years resulting from the
different strategy combinations.
The choices along the rows in Figure I represent those
available to suspect A and the choices along the columns
represent the choices available to suspect B. The numbers in
each cell represent the length of jail time that each player will
receive as a consequence of the combination of the choices
made by each suspect.'" For example, when suspect A
confesses while suspect B remains silent, suspect A will receive
zero years in jail and suspect B will receive ten years in jail.
After modeling the game, the next step is to identify the
strategies that maximize each suspect's result.
The suspects share a goal, minimizing jail time.'65 The
best strategy for both suspects to follow is to confess. 66 If
suspect A confesses while suspect B remains silent, then
suspect A will spend no time in jail while suspect B spends ten
years behind bars. The opposite result would occur if suspect B
confesses and suspect A remains silent. If both suspects
confess, then they each spend five years in jail. While five
years in prison is a worse result than no jail time, five years in
jail is better than ten years in jail. Confession guarantees each
suspect the best result possible irregardless of the choice made
by the other suspect.67 No matter what suspect A does, suspect
B will improve his result by confessing. Without information
16 See id.; Shubik, supra note 154, at 288.
14 Suspect A's jail time is listed first. Suspect B's jail time is listed last.
See BAIRD ETAL., supra note 149, at 33.
IGG See id.
1" See id.
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regarding the choice made by the other suspect, neither
suspect has an incentive to deviate from this strategy.
168
This combination of strategies, from which neither
suspect has an incentive to deviate, is called the Nash
equilibrium. 169 While this does not result in the best possible
outcome, it is the most stable and most efficient outcome. 7 ' By
modeling a conflict in this way, the parties can utilize available
information to develop strategies to maximize their reward. It
is precisely this type of strategic behavior which Brams and
Taylor claim Adjusted Winner will deter without sacrificing
either party's satisfaction with the result. 7'
B. How Adjusted Winner Works
The Adjusted Winner Procedure is a point allocation
scheme that allows parties to assign values to individual
negotiation issues, representing their preference to win that
issue.'72 In divorce, the issues involved are the marital assets
and the point assignments represent the individual's
preference to receive a particular asset.7 3 Similar point
16 See id.
169 See id. at 21. Nash equilibrium is explained as:
The combination of strategies that players are likely to choose is one
in which no player could do better by choosing a different strategy
given the strategy the other chooses. The strategy of each player must
be a best response to the strategies of the other. The solution concept
based on this principle is known as a Nash equilibrium. Introduced by
John Nash in 1950, the Nash equilibrium has emerged as a central-
probable the central-solution concept of game theory.
BAIRD, supra note 149, at 21; see also Shubik, supra note 154, at 291 ("The most highly
used solution concept applied to games in strategic form is the noncooperative
equilibrium suggested by J. F. Nash Jr.").
170 See Shubik, supra note 154 at 292 ("If both players act accordingly, they
will confirm their expectations and neither will have any incentive to depart from the
resultant outcome, even though there may be outcomes which might yield more to both
of them.").
171 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 197; BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note
15, at 80 ("if knowledge is roughly symmetric, then attempts by both sides to be
strategic can lead to disaster"). BRAMS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 67 (claiming
Adjusted Winner guarantees efficiency, envy-freeness, and equitability).
172 See BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 70; Brains & Taylor(l), supra
note 14, at 65; Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 192.
173 See BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 70 ("The parties a indicate how
much they value obtaining the different goods ... by distributing 100 points across
them.").
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allocation algorithms were suggested by two separate groups in
the mid-1980s in an effort to facilitate stalled nuclear arms
reduction negotiations.74 The inherent advantage to point
allocation schemes is the opportunity for negotiating parties to
subjectively value the items over which they'are bargaining.17
Brams and Taylor suggest that this advantage will lead to a
property division in divorce optimizing the allocation of
resources between the couple.'76 To evaluate the effectiveness of
Adjusted Winner in divorce bargaining, it is necessary to
analyze how the procedure affects the existing problems and
whether the procedure will create any new problems.177
174 Russell Leng and William Epstein proposed that each superpower should
distribute 1000 points among their adversary's arsenal. The adversary would then
decide which arms to reduce in an effort to achieve an agreed point reduction. See
Russell J. Leng & William Epstein, Calculating Weapons Reductions, 41 BULL. OF THE
ATOM. Sci. 39-41 (1985), cited in BRAMS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 65 n.3.
Stephen Salter proposed a similar procedure in which each superpower would value its
own arsenal by distributing 1000 points and then each superpower would dictate which
of their adversary's weapons should be eliminated to achieve an agreed upon point
reduction. See Stephen H. Salter, Stopping the Arms Race, 2 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH.
74-92 (1986), cited in BRAMS & TAYLOR(M), supra note 14, at 65 n.3.
175 See Liebman, supra note 1, at 5. Liebman discusses some of the
weaknesses with common negotiation techniques. She notes that adversarial
negotiation is the most common style of bargaining, but it operates as a zero-sum
game. See id. A zero-sum game assumes that both parties value the object of the
negotiation equally and treats a gain for one party as an equal loss for the other party.
This view leads parties and attorneys to attempt to negotiate better than their
adversary, rather than focusing on reaching an amicable agreement. The problem with
this theory is that "divorce is not a zero-sum game." Id. at 7. Fisher & Ury developed
an alternative to adversarial negotiation which they call principled negotiation. See
FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at vii. The four rules of principled negotiation are:
separate the people from the problem, focus on interests, develop a variety of solutions,
and judge results objectively. See id. at 11. When parties are aware of how they value
items in a negotiation, they will be better prepared to bargain, thereby increasing their
ability to reach settlement. See id. at 42 ("The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in
conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns,
and fears.").
... See BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 71. Brams and Taylor explain:
Preferences are usually private information, and we cannot expect
people to honestly reveal them unless it is in their interest to do so.
The challenge, therefore is to design procedures that induce the
claimants to reveal enough information about their preferences so that
an equitable and efficient solution can be implemented.
Id. (quoting H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQuiTY IN THEORYAND PRACTICE 130 (1994)).
177 See supra, Part II.
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To illustrate how the procedure works, let us assume
that a hypothetical couple, Jack and Jill, are seeking a divorce.
For simplicity, let us also assume Jack and Jill have no
children. The following assets and liabilities must be
distributed between them: the marital residence, a boat, two
antique rocking chairs, a Picasso original, a full set of china, a
1999 Honda, a 1974 Gremlin, and a $10,000 joint credit card
debt. The first step in the procedure is for each party to
distribute 100 points among the various items to reflect the
individual's preference for receiving that particular item. 17
Conversely, the point allocation for the credit card debt
represents the person's preference to not be liable for that debt.
Table 1 reflects the point assignments in this example:
Jill Jack
House - 1551 House - 45
Boat - 5 Boat - 10
Chairs - 8 Chairs - 2
Picasso - 5 Picasso -15
China- 1 China- 1
Honda - 18 Honda - 15
Gremlin - 1 Gremlin -
Debt - 7 Debt - M
Table 1. Jack's and Jill's initial point assignments. A box means that
person valued the item higher than the other party.
178 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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Initially, each party is granted any item to which they
assigned a higher point value than the other party.179 In this
example, that means that Jack initially receives the Picasso,
the boat, the Gremlin, and release from the credit card debt for
a point total of thirty-seven.' ' Jill receives the marital home,
the antique rocking chairs, the full credit card debt, and the
Honda for a point total of eighty-one. 8' Any items the parties
valued equally are initially granted to the party with lower
points, which in this example is Jack.'82 Therefore, he receives
the china increasing his point total to thirty-eight.1 83 All the
listed items have been distributed, so the initial phase of the
algorithm is complete. At this point, the parties begin the
adjustments. 8'
The adjustments phase is intended to equalize the
parties' point totals. When point totals are equalized, the
distribution has been optimized for: (1) efficiency, because the
allocations maximize utility of the goods; 8 5 (2) equitability,
because both parties receive the same subjective value;S' and
(3) envy-freeness because neither party would trade their
portion for the other parties' portion.8 7 Point totals are
adjusted by transferring property, which was assigned in the
1. See BRAMS & TAYLOR(l), supra note 14, at 70; BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra
note 15, at 72; Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 192-93.
18" The Picasso = 15, the boat = 10, the Gremlin = 4, and freedom from debt =
8.15+ 10+4+8=37.
18' The house = 55, the rocking chairs = 8, and the Honda = 18. 55 + 8 + 18 =
81.
12 In THE WIN-WIN SOLUTION, Brains and Taylor award tied items to the
initial loser. See BRAM1S & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 75. In FAIR DIVISION: FROM
CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION, they award tied items to the initial winner.
See BRAM s & TAYLOR(l), supra note 14, at 69. Who receives the item does not matter,
because as we will soon see, an item valued equally by both parties will be the first to
be transferred in the adjustment phase.
183 Previous point total of 37, plus one point from the china set equals 38.
"4 See BRAiS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 69; BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra
note 15, at 72; Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 193.
185 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 192 ("Both parties cannot benefit by
the swap of items-if one party does better, the other must do worse.").
BG See id. ("The equitability adjustment, which gives each player [equal
points] ... may be interpreted as providing each player with what he or she perceives
to be [an equal portion of the goods].").
187 See id. at 191 ("Neither party will envy the items the other party receives
because [he or she] will think the [combined] value of [his or her] items is more than 50
percent of the total.").
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initial phase of the procedure, from one individual to another."'
When an item is transferred, the point total of the person
losing the item is reduced by his or her point assignment for
that item.189 Likewise, the point total of the person receiving
the item is increased by his or her point assignment for that
item.19 Transfers of property affect the spouses' point totals
unequally because the spouses value the transfer differently.1 9'
Before making adjustments, the point ratios of each
item must be calculated with the formula: R 1v ' where R
is the point ratio, P is the point assignment of %he initial
winner, and PL is the point assignment of the initial loser.' 2
The point ratios for the property in the Jack and Jill example
are set forth in Table 2:
Item of Property Point Ratio
House 1.22
Boat
Chairs 4
Picasso
China
Honda 1.2
Gremlin
Debt
Table 2 shows the point ratios for the items that may be transferred
from the winner of the initial phase, Jill, to the loser, Jack.
All transfers must observe two rules. First, an item
with a lower point ratio is always transferred before any item
with a higher point ratio. 9' Second, if transferring an item will
result in the loser acquiring more points than the winner, the
18 See id. at 193.
See, e.g., id.
190 See, e.g., Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 193.
'9' See, e.g., id.
192 See BRAMs & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 73.
1'3 This transfer order ensures efficiency because the items with the lowest
ratio item will give the loser the most points while taking the fewest points away from
the winner. See BRAmS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 69.
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item is not transferred in full; it must be apportioned between
the two parties."' The proportionalit of he split is determined
using the following equation:195 P V-tP T , where P represents
the percentage of the item to be transferred, DtP represents the
difference in total points between the parties,' and T
represents the sum of the two parties' point assignments for
the item to be transferred.
197
For Jack and Jill, the first item to be transferred to
Jack is the Honda, with a point ratio of 1.2.' After the
transfer, Jill has sixty-three points and Jack has fifty-two
points, so another item must be transferred.'9 The next item to
be transferred is the house, with a point ratio of 1.22.' oo If the
house was transferred entirely, Jill would have only eight
points, while Jack would have ninety-nine. This transfer gives
Jack more points than Jill, violating the second transfer rule.
To equalize the point totals without violating any rules, only a
portion of the house can be transferred. 2" According to the
procedure, only 11% of the house must be transferred. 0 ' To
transfer 11% of the house, the house must be sold and the sale
proceeds divided. This partial transfer gives Jill 89% of her
initial valuation or 48.9 points and Jack 11% of his initial
valuation or 4.9 points.23 Both parties now have equal point
totals of 58.4.' 04 With the parties' point totals equalized, the
property distribution is complete."5
194 Some items may be easily divisible for apportionment, such as a bank
account. When an item is not divisible, such as a house, it must be sold so the proceeds
can be distributed proportionally. Another solution would be for one party to buy the
other party's proportion. See BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 77.
... See id. at 74.
1. D0, = P, - P., where P. represents the current point total of the winner, and
PL represents the current point total of the loser.
19 T=T + T,,, where T represents the point assignment of the initial winner,
and TL represents the point assignment of the initial loser.
19 Ratio = 18/15 = 1.2.
10 Jill's point total = 81 - 18 = 63. Jack's point total = 37 + 15 = 52.
200 Ratio = 55/45 = 1.22.
201 See, e.g., BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 73-74.
202 Transfer percentage = D,, /T = (63-52)/100 = 0.11 = 11%. See, e.g., BRAMs &
TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 73-74.
203 See id.
2" Jill had 10 points without the house. Adding 88% of her house valuation,
48.4 points, gives her 58.4 points. Jack had 53 points without his portion of the house.
Adding 12% of his house valuation, 5.4 points, gives him 58.4 points.
205 "Both people get exactly the same number of points, based on their own
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C. Weighted Distribution
This procedure can also be adapted to favor one party
over the other. For instance, if the parties, the court, or the
state decides that the wife should receive 60% of the marital
assets, this can be built into the calculations. In our previous
example, if it was decided that Jill should receive 60% of the
assets, then transfers during the adjustment phase would be
made until the Jack's point total was 60% of Jill's point total,
rather than adjusting until their point totals are equal."7 After
each adjustment, the ratio would be calculated to determine if
more adjustments are necessary. When the point totals require
that an asset or liability be transferred in part, the following
formula can be solved for X: P, - TwX = R(PL - TLX), where X
represents the percentage to be transferred, P1 and PLrepresent
the point totals of the winner and loser respectively, Tw and TL
represent the points for the item to be transferred as assigned
by the winner and loser respectively, and R represents the
desired ratio between the parties' point totals.2 8
IV. DOES ADJUSTED WINNER WORK AS CLAIMED?
Adjusted Winner makes some necessary assumptions,
which may not be true for all divorcing couples.29 Hence,
Adjusted Winner will facilitate the division of marital assets
for some couples, but it may be too simplistic for other couples.
First this Part will analyze Adjusted Winner's weakness. Then
Adjusted Winner will be analyzed to determine how it will
impact the existing divorce bargaining problems previously
discussed in Part 11.210
valuations of the different items." BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 74.
211 See BRAMs & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 76.
207 If Jill receives 60%, then Jack receives the remaining 40%. The ratio
between their two portions is 40/60 = 2/3 = 60%. Mathematically this division can be
represented by the equation: Jack = Jill * 2/3, or Jack = Jill*60%.
218 See id. This same formula was used in the preceding example, but in a
simplified form.
219 See Jolls et al., supra note 66, at 1471 ("Economic analysis of law usually
proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence
gives much reason to doubt these assumptions.").
210 See supra Part II.
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A. Weaknesses
Adjusted Winner translates human preferences into
numbers, then applies a mathematical algorithm to distribute
the property, maximizing each party's points.2 1' Translating
human thoughts and desires into numbers requires some
assumptions to be made. First, Adjusted Winner assumes an
individual's desire for an item of property is independent from
their desire for all other items.212 In reality, an individual's
preferences may be linked, such that he or she wishes to
receive certain items together or to receive neither item.213 The
second assumption Adjusted Winner makes is in the
adjustment phase. If the final adjustment requires a
proportional distribution, the procedure assumes that the
declared preferences for the particular item are equal to the
parties' preferences for receiving the money equivalent of the
item. 214 In some instances, a person's valuation for a particular
item will be based purely on the item's fair market value; other
times, a person's valuation may be based on emotions. Finally,
Adjusted Winner assumes every dispute can be resolved in only
three ways: (1) the wife receives the property, (2) the husband
receives the property, or (3) they split the property based on a
mathematical formula.25 For divorce issues like alimony, child
211 See supra Part III.
212 See BRAAIS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 72 ("[The equalization] of the
players' [points] assumes that points (or utilities) are additive and linear ...
Additivity here means that the value of two or more goods to a player is equal to the
sum of their points .... Neither assumption is necessarily a good reflection of players'
preferences.").
213 See BRAus & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 72 ("Thus, goods may not be
'separable' because of complimentaries-that is, obtaining one good may affect the
value one obtains from others.").
214 Brains and Taylor suggest three methods to execute a proportional
transfer. First, the item can be sold and the proceeds distributed proportionally. See
BRAINIS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 77. Second, one party can purchase the other
party's portion, so the item can be transferred whole. See id. Third, a mediator can tell
the parties the item to be transferred and the proportion to transfer without revealing
who won the larger portion. See BRAMS & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 100-01. The
parties can then negotiate to determine what it means to win the separate shares. See
id. The third solution is undesirable because it will introduce all the problems that
exist in the current divorce bargaining situations, completely obfuscating any benefit
from Adjusted Winner.
215 See, e.g., Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 194-96 (applying Adjusted
Winner to a hypothetical divorce settlement).
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custody, and child support, there are a myriad of possible
resolutions. It would be a disservice to parents and children to
allow custody to be determined based solely on mathematical
formulas.
1. Relationship Between Assets
Adjusted Winner assumes that the goods to be
distributed are completely separable.216 In other words, the
procedure assumes that an individual's personal preference for
a particular item is completely independent from that person's
preference for any other item.217 This assumption is often
incorrect. For example, in the Jack and Jill example, Jill's
point allocation for the rocking chairs may depend on who
ultimately receives the house. If she receives the house her
preference for the rocking chairs may increase compared to the
situation in which Jack receives the house.218 This relationship
between items is lost in Adjusted Winner because participants
are forced to declare their preferences without knowing which
items they will receive and which items they will not receive. If
Jill does not receive the house, some or all of the points she
allocated to the rocking chairs may be misallocated, distorting
all of her point allocations.219  This could lead to a
mathematically equitable solution that does not accurately
reflect the real-life solution.
Brams and Taylor recognize this weakness and offer a
possible method to resolve it.22 They suggest grouping together
items that are related so the parties can assign one point value
to the entire group. For instance, rather than list the house
and the rocking chairs separately, Jack and Jill could list one
item, the house with the rocking chairs. With this grouping,
216 See BRA1,S & TAYLOR(l), supra note 14, at 72.
217 See id. (recognizing that Adjusted Winner will only provide an equitable
distribution if the utility a person receives from two items is equal to the utility that a
person would receive from each item separately).
218 See id. ("goods may not be 'separable' because of complimentaries [sic]-
that is, obtaining one good may affect the value one obtains from others").
219 See id. (requiring "separability" [sic] of items to achieve equitability in the
result).
r ) See id. at 97 (suggesting that players "lump nonseparable [sic] issues
together").
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Jill would be able to assign a point value to the pair of items
that accurately reflects her true preference."1
This modification increases the transaction costs of
the process because participants must determine how items
should be grouped together prior to assigning their point
allocations.2 In some situations, groupings may be intuitive,
like pairing the house with its mortgage or the car with its
lease. In other situations, the parties may not be able to agree
on how to group items together, causing a bargaining
breakdown almost immediately. For this reason, some
divorcing couples may be better off utilizing a more flexible
method of bargaining, such as mediation or attorney
represented negotiations. If it is not apparent whether a
particular couple will be able to use Adjusted Winner, it should
still be tried. In the event the procedure fails to produce an
acceptable result, little time or energy will have been lost. If
the procedure does work, it can quickly lead the party to an
equitable and efficient result.2"
2. Preference for Ownership Compared to Preference
for Fair Market Value
Adjusted Winner forces the parties to translate their
subjective preference for an item into a numerical value. If the
final adjustment requires a proportional transfer of a non-
divisible item, then a second translation occurs. The initial
point allocation representing the parties' preference to receive
the actual item is translated into a point allocation
representing the parties' preference to receive that same item's
market value. For instance, in the Jack and Jill example, the
house must be sold to effectuate the final proportional transfer.
Jill's initial point assignment of fifty-five represented her
preference for receiving the actual house. In the end, Jill
receives money, but Adjusted Winner adjusts her point total as
22' See BRAMs & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 97.
= See id. at 98 ("We conclude ... that two players, in order to maximize their'
point totals under A[djusted] Wfinner] . . . would be well advised to apply [this]
procedure to as many different issues as they can reasonably make separable and
additive.").
See infra, Part V.B, for a discussion of Adjusted Winner's strengths.
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if she received a portion of the actual house. She receives one
item of property, but is treated as if she received a different
item. In other words, the mathematics of Adjusted Winner may
no longer represent reality.
This distortion is caused by Adjusted Winner's
inability to account for human emotion. A person will include
many factors in his or her decision when determining the
initial point allocations. These factors may include both
emotional and economic aspects of ownership." For example,
Jill may have a sentimental attachment to the house because
her children grew up there. If the house is to be sold, rather
than granted to her, she may have assigned it a lower point
value.225 By lowering her valuation for the house she would
have had additional points to allocate to another item, such as
the Honda. Because the point allocations are declared before
the ultimate result is known, the initial declarations may not
be accurate when the procedure is complete.
Alternatively, the couple could negotiate after the
procedure has been completed.226 In this scenario, when a non-
divisible item must be divided in the adjustment phase, rather
than liquidating the asset, the parties receive an interest in
that item. These interests can then be exchanged freely
between the couple, resulting in complete ownership by one
spouse.227 While this may solve the problem of non-divisibility,
it introduces the need for traditional bargaining. Introducing
traditional bargaining into the process will introduce power
imbalances and coercion, negating some of the benefits of
Adjusted Winner."' To preserve the benefits of Adjusted
224 See Richard D. Schepp, Comment, A Call for Recognition of Owners'
Subjective Valuations in Residential Construction Defect Cases, 1989 Wis. L. REV.
1139, 1155 (1989) ("the subjective value attached to a good or service is rarely, if ever,
the same as the market value of that good or service.").
See id. at 1552 (suggesting that use of subjective valuations to determine
damages in residential construction contract cases would "recognize the personal
nature of a home's aesthetics").
26 See BRAMS & TAYLOR(l), supra note 14, at 100-01 (suggesting that in the
event of a proportional transfer of a non-divisible item, such as a house, that the
proportions won by each party should be kept secret until the "parties are able to
hammer out an agreement on what winning [each] proportion [sic] means").
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
22 See supra Part III; infra Part IV.B; see also BEAMS & TAYLOR(1), supra note
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Winner without generating absurd results, it should not be
applied if: (1) most of the property to be divided is not easily
divisible, or (2) when the parties cannot agree that receiving
the fair market value of a particular item would be
satisfactory.2 9
3. Unsuitable Issues
Adjusted Winner works best with issues that can be
resolved with an all-or-nothing approach and can be easily
divided in the event of a proportional transfer. However, not all
divorce issues can be resolved this simply. Child custody, for
example, is rarely resolved with an all-or-nothing approach."0
Usually the parents share custody through some formal
agreement they developed and the court approved. 1 Because a
child is involved, rather than an inanimate material object, it
is beneficial for the parents to have increased control and
flexibility when negotiating the custody arrangement. 2  This
14, at 101 (failing to mention the potential for strategic behavior when the parties
negotiate for transfer of partial interests in property resulting from proportional
transfer during adjustment phase of Adjusted Winner).
These situations may arise when there are few items to distribute or the
items are mostly liquid accounts. For example, Adjusted Winner would work better for
a couple who has cash savings accounts and some investments, but do not own any real
estate, than for a couple who have invested primarily in their own home.
2" See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 72 ("When couples with
children separate, they face a period of months or even years during which the terms of
their legal divorce will be worked out and a custody decree issued.").
Maccoby and Mnookin found that 90% of custody agreements in their
California study resulted in the mother receiving sole physical custody, while legal
custody was shared between the parents. See id at 112. Maccoby and Mnookin also
found that in "fewer than one-quarter of the cases was there actually a conflict between
parental requests for custody." Id. at 100; see also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note
9 at 955 ("Private agreements concerning [child custody] matters are possible and
common, but agreements cannot bind the court .... On the other hand, available
evidence on how the legal system processes undisputed divorce cases involving minor
children suggests that parents actually have broad powers to make their own deals.").
212 See Mnookin & Kornhauser supra note 9 at 958 ("A child's future
relationship with each of his parents is better ensured and his existing relationship
less damaged by a negotiated settlement than by a court after an adversary
proceeding.... Second, the parents will know more about the child than will the judge,
since they have better access to information about the child's circumstances and
desires.").
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allows all the possible variables, such as residence, schooling,
medical care, and religious affiliation, to be properly
considered. 3
If Adjusted Winner was applied to resolve a custody
issue, the parents would have to predetermine what it means
to "win" or "lose" the custody issue. Furthermore, they must
decide how to resolve the issue in the event a proportional
transfer must be made. To apply Adjusted Winner to custody
disputes, Brains and Taylor suggest that winning the custody
issue could mean an award of sole custody.234 In the event of a
proportional transfer of custody rights, Brains and Taylor
suggest the winner of the larger portion should receive primary
custody while the winner of the smaller portion receives
visitation rights.235 Before the parties are told who has won
primary custody, Brains and Taylor suggest that they
negotiate to determine what the visitation rights will be. 6
This suggested approach to child custody limits the
couple's flexibility and will not be practical. Brams and Taylor's
approach requires the party to initially limit themselves to
only two choices, representing "winning" and "losing" the child
custody issue. This approach is too restrictive and fails to
include all the factors necessary to fully explain the custody
arrangement 7 "The parental divorce is especially complex in
2 See id. at 957 ("who can better evaluate the comparative advantages of
alternative arrangements than the parties themselves").
2 See Brais & Taylor, supra note 18, at 196-97.
25 See BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 117 ("The relative winner will
get primary custody, and the relative loser will have visitation rights.").
3 See id. ("the two sides are more likely to reach a settlement if they do not
know which side they will end up on").
27 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 37. Maccoby and Mnookin
explain:
In some families, divorce means that one parent essentially drops out
of the parental role .... In other families, both parents continue to be
involved, and for these families important new issues emerge: What
kind of agreement can the parents come to concerning the amount of
time the children will spend with each parent? How will they divide
responsibilities for getting the children back and forth? Should they
operate independently, or should they try to achieve some form of
coordination between the two households with respect to standards of
behavior set for the children, discipline, chores, allowances, privileges,
and so forth? When important decisions need to be made concerning
the child's life . . . should the parents plan to discuss each issue and
decide jointly? What decisions should be left to the independent
decision-making of whichever parent has the child with him/her [sic]
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cases of joint custody."23 Application of Adjusted Winner will
greatly oversimplify the complexity of child custody and is not
the best method to construct a shared custody agreement.
Similarly, Adjusted Winner may greatly oversimplify
child support and alimony awards. Because the custody
agreement will affect the need for child support, child support
should be resolved in conjunction with the custody
arrangement. 9 Courts and divorcing couples consider many
factors when determining child support and alimony
obligations.240 Adjusted Winner cannot properly include all the
relevant factors to calculate an appropriate child support or
alimony award.241
For divorcing couples with no children, this weakness
of Adjusted Winner will not be a problem. For couples with
children, Adjusted Winner will still be effective to resolve the
division of marital assets when the child custody and support
agreements are complete. For couples considering only
alimony, Adjusted Winner should first be applied to divide all
the marital assets because the property distribution will
ultimately affect a party's need for or ability to pay alimony.242
at the time?
Id.
2's Id. at 38.
29 See MAcCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 116 ("The likelihood of a child
support award, however, varied with which parent was awarded physical custody (or
whether the couple were awarded joint custody).").
240 See id. at 123 (finding certain factors relevant to determining child support
awards, but also finding "nearly half of the variation in award size remains
unexplained suggest[ing] that discretion may play a substantial role in child support
determination); id. at 123-24 (finding multiple factors relevant to alimony award, such
as duration of marriage, mother's age, home ownership, divorce initiator, education
level of the father, and age of the youngest child); see also Garrison(2), supra note 42,
at 699-711.
241 But see Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 195 (applying Adjusted Winner
to determine property division, alimony, and child custody). Brains and Taylor do not
discuss what to do in the event alimony rights need to be apportioned between the
party. See id.
242 See Garrison(2), supra note 42, at 627-28 ("As time went by, some courts
began to employ property distribution for broader remedial purposes and gave a wife
property that she had not brought into the marriage to make up for a husband's
inability or unwillingness to pay adequate alimony."); see also id. at 693 (suggesting
that "tradeoffs in property for alimony, and vice versa, occurred more frequently under
the new [equitable distribution laws]").
Adjusted Winner could be modified to include alimony in certain cases, but
some preliminaries would be necessary. Before including alimony in Adjusted Winner,
the parties must determine who will pay alimony if any should be awarded, what
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B. Strengths
As discussed in Part II, current divorce procedures do
not effectively prevent unfair agreements caused by the
disparity between the parties' ability to bear the transaction
costs of divorce. The effect of power imbalance may be reduced
by lowering the transaction costs of private bargaining which
Adjusted Winner accomplishes by easily, quickly, and
simultaneously distributing all property.24 Power imbalances
can also be reduced by limiting activities which increase the
transaction costs such as emotional decision making, strategic
behavior, and excessive lawyering. Adjusted Winner does not
prevent strategic behavior, but does encourage and reward
honesty.2' Likewise, the procedure does not prohibit emotional
decision making, but parties are forced to recognize the
consequences of emotional actions.245 Adjusted Winner limits
excessive lawyering because unlike traditional bargaining the
lawyer's primary role is not as a negotiator, but rather as a
counselor and financial advisor.2" Uncertainty of entitlements
will not raise the transaction costs of applying Adjusted
Winner, which generates a property distribution irrespective of
the statutory entitlements. Additionally, Adjusted Winner
generates a property division based on the individuals'
amount will be paid, and for what duration alimony will be required. See Brams &
Taylor, supra note 18, at 194. If the parties agree that the husband will pay alimony to
the wife, this right can be added to the list of items to be distributed. See id. The
husband will assign a point value to release him from any alimony obligation, and the
wife will assign a point value to the right to receive alimony. See id. Adjusted Winner
can then be used to simultaneously resolve, with exception of child support, all the
financial issues in divorce.
2- See BRAMiS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 116 ("[Adjusted Winner] could
provide many divorcing couples with rapid closure of their often endless haggling over
money [and] physical property.").
244 See id. at 83 ("sincerity [is] a guarantee strategy under A[djusted]
W[inner]: No matter what strategy an opponent chooses, sincerity guarantees an envy-
free portion to the sincere party").
2 See id. at 117 ("the assignment of points to items will weaken one's desire
to spite the other person, because to do so would be to give up points on something one
may value more").
24G See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 203 ("lawyers as well as mediators
can play a valuable role in lAdjusted Winner] 0 by helping their clients make their
point assignments in a way that reflects their honest estimates of worth.... Lawyers
and mediators can also assist the parties in predicting possible outcomes .. .and
running through various scenarios they might face.").
1382 [Vol. 66: 4
PROPERTY DIVISIONAT DIVORCE
preferences, maximizing the economic utility of the marital
assets after divorce.247 Thus, Adjusted Winner will reduce
power imbalances in divorce bargaining, increasing the
likelihood of achieving a fair result.
1. Reducing Transaction Costs
Two qualities of Adjusted Winner should work to
lower the total transaction costs of the bargaining process. The
procedure is simple to apply and it focuses the divorcing couple
on the division of property, avoiding unrelated conflicts.
Together, these two qualities of Adjusted Winner will
significantly facilitate the process, lowering the overall
financial and emotional costs, and facilitate a quick resolution.
Traditional divorce bargaining requires the parties to
determine their positions, propose a resolution, analyze where
their opposing positions conflict, and then resolve conflicts one
by one.248 Determining one's position involves an analysis of his
or her preference for different resolutions, preference for risk,
and ability to bear transaction costs. Parties employing
Adjusted Winner need only determine their resolution
preferences, not their complete positions. Simplifying the
preparatory work should speed up the whole process and lower
the transaction costs.
Because Adjusted Winner rapidly generates a
property distribution, there is a heavier emotional cost on the
preparatory work.249 An unfavorable result is due solely to the
parties' declared preferences, not the procedure."0 Shifting the
emotional burden away from the negotiation session should
prevent the couple from developing new negative feelings
toward each other or amplifying any existing ones. 1 This
247 See BR~As & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 74 ("Subjectively speaking, 1
each person does as well as the other, assuming their point valuations are honest
reflections of their desires for the different items.").
248 See Gitlin, supra note 60, at 111-26 (describing various stages in
negotiating property division at divorce).
242 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 203 (recognizing the increased role
of mediators and attorneys in determining the parties' preferences and understanding
the potential outcomes).
2W Accord Liebman, supra note 1, at 19 (recognizing the risk of different
negotiation styles).
2 ; See id. at 23 (recognizing the long term benefits of cooperative negotiation,
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should reduce the overall emotional cost of the process,
speeding up the parties' return to more productive activities
and leading to cooperation in the future.252
Adjusted Winner may oversimplify a spouse's
subjective value for a particular asset because the valuation
either depends on receipt of another asset, or the procedure
distributes the asset based on fair market value. If
oversimplification occurs the distribution generated may not be
accepted by one or both parties. If the solution generated is not
acceptable, the parties will be forced to begin traditional
negotiations or look to the court to determine the division. By
providing the couple with a starting point, based on their
declared preferences, for further negotiations, Adjusted Winner
will still facilitate any further bargaining. For example,
strategic behavior will be much less effective if both spouses
are aware of the other spouse's true preferences. Similarly, if
the court must resolve the conflict, a clear declaration of
preferences will greatly assist the court in reaching a result
tailored to the couple's desires. The court can distribute the
property following Adjusted Winner and make modifications
necessary to guarantee equitability. Without this information,
negotiation and court proceedings require a period of
information gathering, demanding time and energy.253 So, even
in failure, the Adjusted Winner procedure has potential to
reduce the emotional and financial costs of divorce.254
because the divorcing couple will likely need to resolve future conflicts alone).
M2 See id.; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 956 ("Given the
substantial delays that often characterize contested judicial proceedings, agreement
can often save time and allow each spouse to proceed with his or her life.");
Leatherberry, supra note 48, at 25 ("ill-feelings between the parties very likely will
continue for a long time"); see also BRAIls & TAYLOR(1), supra note 14, at 113-14
("Since the settlement is not the product of protracted negotiations or court battles, it
is likely to lead to a more satisfyring and durable outcome and foster more civil future
relations between the parties").
' See Skoloff, supra note 33, at 38 ("It is absolutely essential that the
attorney fully understand the circumstances of the litigation before commencing
negotiations with the other side."); see generally Garrison(l), supra note 1 (recognizing
the multiple factors judges use to determine an equitable distribution of property).
"5 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 25, at 55 ("[D]ivorcing couples may
gain substantial advantages when they can reach an agreement concerning the
distributional consequences of divorce. They can minimize the transaction costs
involved in adjudication; they can also avoid its risks and uncertainties, and negotiate
an agreement that may better reflect their individual preferences.").
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2. Emotional Decision Making
Adjusted Winner does not provide any direct
incentives for parties to avoid emotional decision making. By
focusing the distribution on subjective valuations, Adjusted
Winner actually makes emotions a more important factor in
the distribution. By providing the spouses with a limited
number of points with which to value the assets, the procedure
forces them to recognize the consequences of their actions and
the limitations of the distribution." Simply stated, points
allocated to one item cannot be allocated to another, forcing a
participant to choose. For example, if Jack assigned the
marital home a high point value merely to deprive Jill, he will
have fewer points to assign to other assets he truly desires, like
the boat. Adjusted Winner forces him to decide what is more
important, receiving the boat or depriving his wife. Weighing
the utility of one result against the utility of another is rational
decision making. 6 This does not preclude emotional decisions;
if a participant desires revenge more than possessing
particular assets, choosing revenge would be a rational
choice. 7
Increasing rational decision making should limit
conflicts because parties will likely recognize the need for
compromise.25 When parties negotiate with an understanding
= See BRAAIS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 117 ("Thus, the assignment of
points to items . . . to spite the other person, . . . would be to give up points on
something one may value more.").
See Posner, supra note 68, at 1551 (defining rationality as "choosing the
best means to the chooser's ends."). Judge Posner provides an example:
[A] rational person who wants to keep warm will compare the
alternative means known to him of keeping warm in terms of cost,
comfort, and other dimensions of utility and disutility, and will choose
from this array the means that achieves warmth with the greatest
margin of benefit over cost, broadly defined.
Id.
See id.
See Ginsburg, supra note 125, at 72. Judge Ginsburg explains:
Another important task is the setting of realistic expectations. Parties
look to the divorce process to meet needs that the system cannot meet.
... When the client is finally forced to face the reality that, in most
cases, the court system or any other system can only make an
equitable division of an inadequate amount of money.
Id.; see also Leatherberry, supra note 48, at 26 (recognizing the risk if one party makes
unreasonable demands).
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of compromise and balance, a resolution will be easier to reach,
lowering the transaction costs. 9 Compromise and balance are
the cornerstones of Adjusted Winner. While a participant may
win every asset he or she values more than the other party, he
or she will lose every asset valued less. Adjusted Winner does
not rely on the parties to compromise. Rather, it is built into
the system.26 °
3. Strategic Behavior
Adjusted Winner effectively discourages strategic
behavior in three ways. First, the procedure relies heavily on
personal preferences. Thus, declaring false preferences will
only reduce a person's chance of receiving what he or she truly
desires. Second, the procedure creates significant hurdles to
succeeding with strategic behavior. Third, power imbalances
creating opportunities for strategic behavior are avoided
because Adjusted Winner disregards statutory entitlements.
By reducing strategic behavior, Adjusted Winner increases the
probability of a fair result. 6'
While Adjusted Winner can be manipulated by one
party through strategic behavior, if both parties act
strategically neither party will be better off.2 This can be
illustrated with the following example.26' Let us assume Jack
and Jill must divide only two items, the house and the boat.
Let us also assume Jack is fully aware of Jill's point
assignments of eighty-five for the house and fifteen for the
boat, before they are declared. Jack's true valuations for these
items (house and boat) are fifteen and eighty-five, respectively.
Rather than declare his true valuations, Jack attempts to
maximize his portion of the division by declaring that his
2 See FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at 73 (suggesting negotiating parties
should invent solutions for mutual gain, rather than assuming the negotiation is to
divide a "fixed pie").
211 See BRAms & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 79 ("[Equitability] is guaranteed
by the equitability adjustment [ and, hence, is built into A[djusted] W[innerl by
design.").
f Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 972-73 ("Parties may
intentionally exaggerate their chances of winning in court in the hope of persuading
the other side to accept less.").
212 See BRAMs & TAYLOR(l), supra note 14, at 82.
263 See id.
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valuations for the house and boat are sixty and forty,
respectively. Compared to his true preferences, these false
declarations may result in Jack receiving a larger portion of
the marital estate. Table 3 shows the values in this example:
Jill's Values Jack's declared Jack's true
values values
House 85 60 15
Boat 15 40 85
Table 3. Jill's truthful point valuations, Jack's strategic valuations,
and Jack's true point valuations, attempting to manipulate the
procedure.
According to the truthful evaluations, both parties
should receive eighty-five total points.2  In this situation, both
parties' preferences are perfectly opposite, so no adjustments
would be necessary. According to the declared preferences, Jill
initially receives eighty-five points, while Jack only receives
forty. Jill must transfer some points to Jack to equalize their
point values. After the adjustment, both participants have 58.6
points.6 Jack, according to his true valuations, has now
received eighty-five points from the boat, plus 4.65 points from
proportional transfer of the house, for a total of 89.65 points. 6
In this scenario, Jack successfully manipulated the procedure
to receive a larger portion of the division than Jill.
27
The situation is different when both parties have
information regarding the other's valuations.6 8 For instance, in
divorce, the parties will likely have intimate knowledge of each
other's likes and dislikes, which can be used to anticipate each
other's declared preferences.269  Using the same truthful
2A Jack would receive the boat for 85 points and Jill would receive the house
for 85 points.
2 The calculation for the transfer percentage is: (85-40)/145 = 31%. Jack
receives 31% of his valuation of 60, or 18.6 for a total of 58.6 points. Jill keeps 69% of
her valuation or 58.6 points.
216 Points transferred = 31% of 15 = 4.65.
267 See, e.g., BRAMS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 79-81.
2G3 See id. at 82.
211 See Liebman, supra note 1, at 17 (listing one distinguishing characteristic
of divorce bargaining to be that "It]he parties have a great deal of information about
each other").
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preferences from the previous example, let us assume that
Jack and Jill are fully aware of each other's true preferences
and that they both expect the other person to declare his or her
preferences truthfully. Jill falsely declares fifty points each for
the house and the boat. Jack again falsely declares sixty for the
house and forty for the boat. Jack would initially receive the
house for a point total of sixty and Jill would receive the boat
for a total of fifty. After point adjustments, both parties will
end up with only 54.6 points."' The point totals based on their
true valuations paint a very different picture. Jack has
received the house for a measly 13.65 points and Jill has
received the boat for a meager 22.7.271 The strategy backfired
terribly with neither party receiving what they desired and the
resources being inefficiently utilized.272
These two examples illustrate that the procedure can
be successfully manipulated when only one person has
information regarding the other party's declared preferences.
When both parties have the same information, attempts at
manipulation can result in a much worse situation than if both
parties were truthful. These situations illustrate how divorce
bargaining through Adjusted Winner is analogous to the
prisoner's dilemma. Like the prisoner's dilemma, the strategy
which is independent of the other participant's actions is the
safest, although not the most profitable. In Adjusted Winner,
the strategy which results in the Nash equilibrium273 is
truthfulness. 4 When one party behaves strategically, the other
270 The calculation for the transfer percentage is: (60-50)/110 = 9.09%. Jack
keeps 89.91% of his points, or 54.5 points. Jill receives 9.09% of her house point
assignment, or 4.5 points.
271 Jack's true point assignment for the house was 15. He transferred 9.09% to
Jill, or 1.36 points. Jill's true point assignment for the boat was 15. She received 9.09%
of her point assignment for the house, or 7.73 points.
272 See BRAAIS & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 82 (describing the situation in
which both parties behave strategically as "massively inefficient, but 0] also leav[ing]
each person extremely envious of the other").
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
274 The following matrix represents the outcomes from the two examples. The
strategies along the row represent Jill's choices and the strategies along the column
represent Jack's choices. The point totals based on their truthful valuations resulting
from the different strategy combinations are represented in the format "Jill's points,
Jack's points." The situation where Jill declares false preferences and Jack declares
truthful preferences is assumed to exactly mirror the situation where Jill is truthful
and Jack is false.
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party will do best by being sincere rather than attempting to be
similarly strategic. If neither party behaves strategically, both
parties will be better off. In this way, the procedure creates an
incentive for both parties to avoid false preferences. This
incentive is not obvious and it will be the responsibility of the
attorneys or mediator to explain this to both parties.275 Once
the couple understands the danger of behaving strategically,
they can focus on determining their own true valuations rather
than wasting energy trying to develop a winning strategy.
Ultimately, this will lower the transaction costs and guarantee
a fair result.
4. Uncertainty of the Law
Adjusted Winner limits the effect legal entitlements
will have in the divorce bargaining process. The procedure
generates a property division independent of the relevant law.
The law will not affect the result whether the law is vague or
favors one spouse over the other since legal entitlements never
enter the algorithm.276 Adjusted Winner is shielded from the
impact of uncertainty of legal entitlements by focusing solely
on the participants' personal preferences. 7 In theory, personal
preferences will be unaffected by legal entitlements. All that is
required for the procedure to succeed is for the parties to be
willing to participate and for the law to permit private
bargaining.
I Truthful Preferences False Preferences
Truthful Preferences 85, 85 89.5, 58.6
False Preferences 58.6, 89.5 22.7, 13.65
See also supra Figure 2 in Part IV.A.
27 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 203 ("Lawyers and mediators can ]
assist the parties in predicting possible outcomes").
27 See supra Part IV.B. The only element which affects the results is the
parties declared preferences.
Cf Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 968 (finding that in traditional
bargaining legal entitlements "gives each parent certain bargaining chips-an
endowment of sorts"). Adjusted Winner can remove the distribution of marital assets
from within the "shadow of the law". Id.
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5. Excessive Lawyering
Adjusted Winner can reduce the harm of excessive
lawyering because the procedure itself provides the solution.
Lawyers are not required for Adjusted Winner to function
properly. The procedure simply requires an operator who
understands how to apply it. This could be a neutral third
party, such as a mediator or unrelated attorney, or both
attorneys could apply the procedure together."8 Unlike
traditional bargaining, attorneys applying Adjusted Winner
will not have multiple opportunities to disagree. With less
opportunity to disagree, there is less opportunity to increase
the transaction costs.
Attorneys or a mediator are still helpful when
applying Adjusted Winner."' Someone will be necessary to
explain Adjusted Winner to the parties, help the parties
determine their valuations, and understand the consequences
of their choices. The couple will also likely need assistance to
develop a complete list of assets for division and determine
their point allocations. Attorneys could also counsel the
individuals on whether the resolution from the procedure
should be accepted or rejected. Additionally, in the event
Adjusted Winner provides a division which one party cannot
accept, attorneys or a mediator will be necessary to assist the
couple in resolving the conflict with a different resolution
method.
6. Personal Preferences
As previously noted, Adjusted Winner takes full
advantage of differences in personal preferences."8 Because the
entire procedure is based on the preferences of the parties,
issues for which their preferences diverge will immediately be
218 See BRAis & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 192 (suggesting that parties
provide their point assignments to a referee or mediator, who will apply the necessary
equations).
279 See Brains & Taylor, supra note 18, at 203.
280 See BRAMs & TAYLOR(2), supra note 15, at 78 ("Efficiency is the hallmark of
jAdjusted Winner]-there is no other assignment of items that can give both parties
more points.").
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separated from the issues for which their preferences collide.
This will greatly facilitate a resolution between the spouses.
Traditional bargaining provides no formal system to filter out
issues that can be easily resolved. Even if Adjusted Winner
fails, the information gathered from it will facilitate further
negotiations or court proceedings because issues for which the
couple's preferences diverge can be quickly separated out and
resolved.
CONCLUSION
Private resolution of divorce disputes is more
beneficial to courtroom litigation because of the potential for
the parties to structure their own divorce settlement."' The
current procedures available to privately divide the marital
property involve the risk of reaching an unfair agreement
because of a power imbalance between the couple. Adjusted
Winner will successfully reduce the risk of an unfair property
division by preventing power imbalances caused by strategic
behavior, legal entitlements, and emotional decision making.
Because Adjusted Winner focuses on the couple's preferences
for particular assets, the division generated will be
economically efficient and subjectively equitable to both
parties. The procedure should be included in the bag of tools
available to divorce lawyers, mediators, and courts.
Adjusted Winner is not appropriate to resolve all
divorce issues. Child custody, child support, and alimony
should not be resolved with Adjusted Winner because the
procedure cannot properly account for all of the relevant
factors. For couples who do not have children and are not
considering an alimony award, Adjusted Winner could be
effective. For couples with children, Adjusted Winner should be
applied only after the couple has separately determined the
custody and support agreement. For couples considering an
alimony award, Adjusted Winner should be applied before
beginning discussions of alimony amount and duration since
the property division will affect the alimony award
negotiations.
2"1 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 956.
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Adjusted Winner may generate a result that does not
accurately reflect the parties' subjective valuations. If the
parties cannot separately value individual property items,
Adjusted Winner should not be utilized. If only a few items are
dependent on each other, they may be grouped together and
jointly distributed through Adjusted Winner. Additionally,
when an item must be sold for a proportional distribution of
the proceeds, the points credited to each party may not reflect
the individual's subjective valuation of the percentage of money
received. This is a relatively small risk since it is a
proportional transfer that only happens to one item. Therefore,
Adjusted Winner should not be utilized when the parties'
subjective values vary greatly from the fair market values for
most of their property.
Jeremy A. Matz
